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The Development of Expected-Loss Methods of Accounting for Credit Losses: A Review with 
Analysis of Comment Letters 
 
SYNOPSIS 
After the financial crisis of the late 2000s, concern about delayed credit-loss recognition under the 
incurred-loss method prompted the FASB and the IASB to develop expected-loss methods. We review 
the development of these methods, including through comment-letter analysis. Initially, the FASB 
recommended immediate full recognition of expected losses, including at day one, and the IASB 
recommended spreading the recognition of initially-expected losses across time. After unsuccessful 
attempts to converge based on proposals that partly reflected initial recommendations of each board, the 
boards eventually adopted different methods. We report that U.S. respondents largely opposed the FASB's 
final method, which required day-one recognition of all expected losses, and that non-U.S. respondents 
largely supported the IASB's final method, which required day-one recognition of 12-month expected 
losses. Day-one loss was controversial and impeded convergence. Our comment-letter analysis suggests 
that a day-one-loss-free more forward-looking incurred-loss method might provide a route to a more 
converged solution. 
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Under the incurred-loss method of accounting for credit-loss impairment, credit losses are only 
recognized if there is evidence that a loss event has occurred. After the financial and banking crisis of the 
late 2000s, concern about delayed recognition of credit losses under the incurred-loss method prompted 
the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) and the International Accounting Standards Board 
(IASB) to develop expected-loss methods. Between 2009 and 2013, five exposure documents were issued 
by the FASB and/or the IASB: an initial IASB exposure draft (ED) (IASB 2009); an initial FASB ED 
(FASB 2010); a joint FASB/IASB supplementary document issued as part of eventually unsuccessful 
attempts to reach a compromise converged solution (FASB/IASB 2011); a second FASB ED (FASB 
2012), which led to a FASB Accounting Standards Update (FASB 2016); a second IASB ED (IASB 
2013), which led to elements of an IASB Accounting Standard (IASB 2014). The changes made by the 
new methods were substantial, with the FASB's method being described by the American Bankers 
Association (ABA) as 'the most sweeping change to bank accounting ever'.1 The new methods themselves 
and the failure to achieve a converged FASB/IASB solution were controversial. 
In this paper, we review the development of the FASB and IASB expected-loss methods of 
accounting for credit losses. We do so by reference to the five exposure documents and related materials, 
standard-setters' board-meeting papers, recordings of board meetings, and our analysis of comment-letter 
responses to key recommendations in the exposure documents. 
In developing their expected-loss methods, the FASB and the IASB readily accepted that the 
information set to be used to support recognition of credit losses should become less restricted and more 
forward-looking than under the pre-existing incurred-loss method. In particular, the information set would 
be expanded to include reasonable and supportable forecasts of future credit-loss-relevant events and 
conditions. However, the preferred methods of the FASB and the IASB were different. The first FASB 
 
1 See: https://www.aba.com/advocacy/our-issues/cecl-implementation-challenges . 
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ED (FASB 2010) included an allowance-adequacy-focused recommendation that all full-contractual-life 
expected credit losses should be recognized immediately. This implied that, for a financial asset originated 
on market terms, a loss and a loss allowance should be immediately established (at 'day one') for all credit 
losses expected on the asset as of the date of its initial recognition. In contrast, the first IASB ED (IASB 
2009) recommended that the effective interest rate for a financial asset should take account of all expected 
cash flows as of the date of initial recognition, after deducting all expected future credit losses on the asset. 
Accrual of interest at this lower integrated effective interest rate (IEIR) would then result in recognition 
of initially-expected credit losses being spread over the asset's life rather than being delayed until the 
occurrence of a loss event as under incurred loss. In FASB/IASB (2011) and subsequent deliberations, the 
standard-setters sought a compromise converged solution that would partly meet both the FASB's 
allowance-adequacy preference and the IASB's IEIR-based spreading preference. Their deliberations 
eventually generated the following proposed method: from initial recognition of a financial asset, the loss 
allowance at each date, including at day one, comprises 12-month expected credit losses; for assets for 
which credit risk increases significantly after initial recognition, it comprises lifetime expected credit 
losses. However, the standard-setters could not agree on this method. The IASB accepted it as a practical 
expedient for its preferred spreading method, recommending it in IASB (2013) and including it in IASB 
(2014). The FASB recommended in FASB (2012) and included in FASB (2016) the Current Expected 
Credit Loss (CECL) method under which an entity would establish, including at day one, a loss and a loss 
allowance for all full-contractual-life expected credit losses. 
Table 1 lists the recommendations from the five exposure documents for which we analyze 
comment-letter responses and summarizes the main results of the analysis of responses. In responses to 
IASB (2009), non-U.S. respondents largely supported spreading across time the recognition of initially-
expected credit losses but largely opposed the operationally-complex IEIR-based method of achieving 
this. Responses to the joint FASB/IASB (2011) indicate that, relative to non-U.S. respondents, U.S. 
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respondents were less supportive of a spreading-focused element of a compromise method and more 
supportive of an allowance-adequacy-focused element. However, U.S. respondents were largely 
unsupportive of the full-contractual-life loss allowances recommended in FASB (2010) and FASB (2012). 
In responses to FASB (2012), U.S. respondents were more supportive of some form of incurred-loss 
method, with many advocating a modified more forward-looking version. In responses to IASB (2013), 
non-U.S. respondents largely supported the IASB's 12-month loss allowance with transfer to lifetime loss 
after significant increase in credit risk, despite widespread negative views about day-one loss  
The issue of day-one recognition of credit losses on assets originated on market terms caused 
difficulty in the development of the expected-loss methods. Day-one loss double-counts initially-expected 
losses within the net book value at the date of initial recognition. We report that it was influential in driving 
comment-letter opposition to the final recommendations of both standard-setters. It was opposed in 
dissenting or alternative views by standard-setters' board members. It was cited in criticism of CECL in 
the U.S. Congress. Disagreement on day-one loss was influential in impeding FASB/IASB convergence 
on accounting for credit losses. We suggest that future research and standard-setting activity on accounting 
for credit losses might consider whether satisfactory timeliness in loss recognition might be achieved 
through a day-one-loss-free modified incurred-loss method that would use an information set for loss 
recognition, similar to that used by expected-loss methods, that is less restricted and more forward-looking 
than that used by the pre-existing incurred-loss method. Our comment-letter evidence suggests that such 
a method might provide a route to future FASB/IASB convergence on accounting for credit losses. 
This paper contributes to the accounting literature by informing future research and standard-
setting deliberations on accounting for credit losses. First, we provide a collective overview, with the aid 
of simplified numerical examples, of the principal recommendations made by the FASB and/or the IASB 
during the development of their expected-loss methods. Within this, we describe a conceptual flaw with 
day-one loss. Second, our comment-letter analysis is informative both with regard to whether respondents 
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supported standard-setters' recommendations and with regard to grounds that were influential in 
generating opposition to recommendations. Third, like Holder, Karim, Lin and Woods (2013) but unlike 
most studies of the content of comment letters, our comment-letter analysis examines responses to FASB 
and IASB exposure documents on a common topic of interest.2 This provides evidence on impediments 
to and prospects for FASB/IASB convergence on accounting for credit losses. Our collective consideration 
of responses to FASB (2012) and IASB (2013) provides evidence of a possible route to future FASB/IASB 
convergence through a day-one-loss-free more-forward-looking incurred-loss method. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II provides background to the 
development of the expected-loss methods. Section III and Appendix A describe our methodology and 
information sources. Section IV describes and comments on exposure documents and related issues and 
reports our comment-letter analysis. Section V describes events relating to FASB (2016) after its issue. 
Section VI considers how day-one loss might have been avoided. Section VII concludes. Appendix B 
gives simplified numerical examples of the application to a portfolio of fixed-rate loans of four methods 
of accounting for initially-expected credit losses referred to in the paper.3  
 
II. BACKGROUND TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE EXPECTED-LOSS METHODS 
 
Accounting for credit losses applies to loans and other financial assets measured at amortized cost 
and to some financial assets measured at fair value. It is a material issue for banks, for which 60 to 70 
percent of total assets typically comprise loans that are predominantly measured at amortized cost 
(Hashim, Li, and O'Hanlon 2016). At the time of the financial and banking crisis of the late 2000s, 
 
2 Prior studies of comment-letter content include Yen, Hirst and Hopkins (2007), who analyze responses to the FASB's 1996 
ED on comprehensive income, Hodder and Hopkins (2014), who analyze responses to the recommendation in FASB (2010) 
that most financial instruments should be measured at fair value, Anantharaman (2015), who analyzes responses to FASB EDs 
on business combinations, and Holder, Karim, Lin and Woods (2013), who analyze responses to FASB and IASB EDs on the 
common topic of contingencies. 
3 The examples depict the evolution over time of the loan account and, for each method, the loss-allowance account and the 
amortized-cost net book value (ACNBV). They are based on a common assumed fact pattern for contractual cash flows and 
initially-expected shortfalls in the collection of contractual cash flows and they assume that initial expectations are realized. 
Total losses recognized over the life of the loans are the same for all methods but timing of recognition differs across methods. 
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International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) and U.S. GAAP accounted for credit losses by the 
incurred-loss method under which losses could only be recognized based on evidence that a restrictively 
defined loss event had occurred. The FASB Codification prior to FASB (2016) stated that, under its 
incurred-loss method, a credit loss is recognized when it is probable that a loss has been incurred based 
on past events and conditions and that 'it is inappropriate to consider possible or expected future trends 
that may lead to additional losses' (FASB Codification, paragraph 310-10-35-4). The IASB's IAS 39 
(IASB 2003, paragraph 59) stated that, under its incurred-loss method, a loss is recognized 'if, and only if, 
there is objective evidence of impairment as a result of one or more events that occurred after the initial 
recognition of the asset (a 'loss event') and that loss event (or events) has an impact on the estimated future 
cash flows of the financial asset or group of financial assets that can be reliably estimated.' Losses expected 
as a result of future events, no matter how likely, were not recognized. Examples of loss events under the 
IAS 39 incurred-loss method include: a borrower's financial difficulty or default; it becoming probable 
that a borrower would enter bankruptcy; 'a measurable decrease in the estimated future cash flows from a 
group of financial assets since the initial recognition of those assets.' Our Appendix B includes an example 
of the recognition across time of initially-expected credit losses under an incurred-loss method.  
At the time of the financial and banking crisis of the late 2000s, accounting for credit losses in the 
U.S. and under IFRS reflected recent re-affirmations of the evidence requirements of the incurred-loss 
method.4 Although such re-affirmations might have reduced credit-loss-related earnings management, of 
which there is much evidence in the literature,5 they might also have reduced the timeliness of loss 
recognition. Evidence of lack of timeliness under incurred loss before the crisis is reported by Balla and 
 
4 In the U.S., the SEC and the U.S. federal banking agencies issued in 2001 guidance aimed at ensuring that loss allowances 
would be appropriately supported by evidence (SAB 102 and FFIEC (2001)). Camfferman (2015) notes that the SEC saw this 
as a re-affirmation of the existing incurred-loss principle in U.S. GAAP. SAB 102 is available at: 
https://www.sec.gov/interps/account/sab102.htm. The 2003 revision of IAS 39 (IASB 2003, paragraph 59) had added the words 
'Losses expected as a result of future events, no matter how likely, are not recognised.'  
5 Evidence of credit-loss-related earnings management is provided by Collins, Shackelford, and Wahlen (1995), Lobo and Yang 
(2001), Kanagaretnam, Lobo, and Mathieu (2003), Shrieves and Dahl (2003), Hasan and Wall (2004), Kanagaretnam, Lobo, 
and Yang (2004), Liu and Ryan (2006), Anandarajan, Hasan, and McCarthy (2007), Perez, Salas-Fumas, and Saurina (2008),  
Fonseca and Gonzalez (2008), Huizinga and Laeven (2012) and Bouvatier, Lepetit, and Strobel (2014). 
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Rose (2015) and Beck and Narayanamoorthy (2013), under U.S. GAAP, and by Gebhardt and Novotny-
Farkas (2011) and Marton and Runesson (2017), under IFRS. Consistent with evidence in those papers, 
the crisis of the late 2000s prompted concern that the restrictive evidence requirements of incurred loss 
had delayed the recognition of predictable credit losses before the crisis. This concern was reflected in 
encouragement to standard-setters to explore more forward-looking methods that would make fuller use 
of credit-loss-relevant expectations to give earlier recognition of losses (BCBS 2009; Dugan 2009; 
Financial Crisis Advisory Group 2009; Financial Stability Board 2009). This included encouragement to 
explore methods based on the concept of expected loss, which was already established in prudential 
regulation in relation to measurement of banks' regulatory capital. 6  Partly in response to such 
encouragement, the IASB and the FASB sought methods that would give earlier loss recognition. 
 
III. METHODOLOGY AND INFORMATION SOURCES  
 
Our review of the development of expected-loss methods of accounting for credit losses is 
structured around five exposure documents: the initial IASB ED (IASB 2009); the initial FASB ED (FASB 
2010); the joint FASB/IASB supplementary document (FASB/IASB 2011); the second FASB ED (FASB 
2012); the second IASB ED (IASB 2013). For each document, we summarize and comment on key issues 
related to the document and its key recommendations. We do so by reference to the document and related 
materials, standard-setters' meeting papers and recordings of IASB and joint FASB/IASB meetings.7 Also, 
for each document, we analyze comment-letter responses to one or more of its key recommendations.  
Table 1 summarizes the recommendations for which we analyze responses. Appendix A gives full 
details of the collection of comment letters, our categorization of respondents by location and by type and 
our coding of responses. As described in Appendix A, we collect comment letters from the FASB and 
 
6 See, for example BCBS (2006, paragraph 43). 
7 We obtained meeting papers from the FASB and IASB web sites and recordings of IASB meetings and joint FASB/IASB 
meetings from the IASB web site. The web sites are https://www.ifrs.org/ and https://www.fasb.org/home.  
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IASB web sites. As also described in Appendix A, we categorize respondents by location as: non-U.S. 
respondents, assumed to be actual or potential IASB constituents; U.S. respondents, assumed to be FASB 
constituents; other respondents, which comprise organizations such as international accounting firms and 
international regulatory organizations. 'Other respondents' are not used in tabulated tests, but some are 
used in untabulated tests. As also described in Appendix A, we also categorize respondents by type as 
preparers or non-preparers. We do so in light of the fact that practicability of implementation was a major 
issue in the development of the methods. Many U.S. preparer respondents are Community Banks or Credit 
Unions (denoted CB&CU). Because of the distinctive features of these preparers, we subdivide U.S. 
preparers into preparers-non-CB&CU and preparers-CB&CU. Table 2 summarizes numbers of 
respondents by non-U.S./U.S./other and by type. As also described in Appendix A, we code responses to 
recommendations as 'for' (which includes partial support), 'against' or 'neutral/missing'. Also, we record 
whether some specific factors regarding the recommendation are cited positively or negatively in the 
comment letters; we refer to these factors as 'grounds' on which the respondent could view the 
recommendation positively or negatively. The grounds recorded are as follows: practicability; usefulness; 
objectivity; day-one loss; other conceptual issues (conceptual issues other than day-one loss); economic 
consequences; regulatory capital; allowance adequacy; allowance overstatement; cliff effect.  
For each recommendation for which we analyze responses, we report results for constituents of 
the board or boards that issued the exposure document containing the recommendation: non-U.S. 
respondents for IASB EDs (IASB 2009; IASB 2013); U.S. respondents for FASB EDs (FASB 2010; 
FASB 2012); non-U.S. respondents and U.S. respondents, separately, for the joint FASB/IASB (2011). 
We also report results for each type of respondent and for aggregations thereof. Our main analysis of 
comment-letter responses comprises, for each recommendation, the following two elements. 
1. We report the percentages of respondents that give the following responses in respect of the 
recommendation: 'for'; 'against'; 'neutral/missing'.  
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2. We examine whether grounds on which respondents viewed a recommendation negatively were 
important in determining that they would oppose the recommendation. We do so by estimating 
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In model (1): against_recommendationr is equal to 1 if respondent r is against the recommendation 
and 0 otherwise; groundn,r is equal to 1 if ground n, which is one of the g grounds in the model, is 
cited negatively by respondent r and 0 otherwise. We interpret a positive and significant coefficient 
on groundn,r as indicating that respondents' negative views on ground n are important in 
determining that they would oppose the recommendation.8 We take steps to avoid problems arising 
from variables with few zero or non-zero cases. First, we estimate the models using Firth's logistic 
regression method, which is suitable for small data sets (Firth 1993).9 Second, we do not estimate 
a model where there are few observations or in the one case where almost all respondents are 
against the recommendation. Third, we exclude grounds cited negatively by fewer than three 
percent of respondents.10 For each recommendation, for each ground cited negatively by more than 
50 percent of any type of respondent, we report the percentages that cited the ground negatively.11 
 
IV. EXPOSURE DOCUMENTS: KEY ISSUES AND COMMENT-LETTER RESPONSES  
Each of the first five subsections of this section deals with one of the five exposure documents. 
Each summarizes and comments on key issues related to the document and its key recommendations, and 
 
8 In presenting regression results, we refer to such cases as indicating that negative views on ground n are significantly 
associated with opposition to the recommendation. 
9 We estimate logistic regression models using the 'firthlogit' procedure in Stata (Joseph Coveney, 2008. 'FIRTHLOGIT: Stata 
module to calculate bias reduction in logistic regression,' Statistical Software Components S456948, Boston College 
Department of Economics, revised 25 July 2015). 
10 In robustness tests, we apply cut-offs of five percent and ten percent. 
11 In all such cases, the percentage of positive cites is seven percent or less and is not reported. 
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reports our analysis of comment-letter responses to recommendations. The final subsection reports 
additional tests. Algebraic representation and numerical examples are for a portfolio of fixed-rate loans. 
 
IASB (2009)  
 In common with the other four exposure documents that we consider, IASB (2009) recommended 
that the recognition of credit losses should use a less restricted more forward-looking information set than 
that used by the pre-existing incurred-loss method (IASB 2009, paragraph IN8). Subsequent exposure 
documents described a less restricted more forward-looking information set as comprising a broader set 
of information relating to past events, current conditions and reasonable and supportable forecasts of 
future credit-loss-relevant events and conditions. See, for example, IASB/FASB (2011, paragraph IN11) 
and FASB (2012, page 1 and paragraph 825-15-25-3).12 
The principal recommendation of IASB (2009) was that the effective interest rate of a financial 
asset should take into account all expected cash flows as of the date of initial recognition, after deducting 
estimates of expected credit losses as of that date (IASB 2009, paragraphs 3-5). Interest would then be 
accrued at this integrated effective interest rate (IEIR). The effects of changes in expectations after initial 
recognition would be recognized when they occur. 
We now describe the IEIR method for dealing with initially-expected credit losses. A standard 
representation of the fair-value transaction price at origination date (o) of a portfolio of fixed-rate loans, 
vo, is as the present value of future contractual cash flows (taking into account transaction costs, etc.), 
denoted co+s, over the term to maturity (m) discounted at the contractual-cash-flow-based effective interest 
rate, hereinafter termed the contractual effective interest rate (CEIR) and denoted ceir: 
 
12 Examples of events that might be included in a more forward-looking information set are given by the American Bankers 
Association (ABA) in describing in a comment letter on FASB (2012) (letter 39A) its proposed Banking Industry Model (BIM). 
The ABA describes forward-looking loss events as events and conditions that, individually or with other events, generally 
precede and can reasonably be expected to cause what have traditionally been viewed as loss events. Examples quoted include 
the emergence of information about the financial difficulty of a borrower's customer, regulatory actions with national, local or 
















  .                                          (2) 
In (2), vo is known, as this is the amount loaned (the transaction price).
13 Also, co+s is known based on the 
loan contracts. Then one can solve for the CEIR. In IASB (2009), the lender must estimate in some manner 
the initially-expected shortfalls in the collection of contractual cash flows over the term to maturity, 
denoted Eo[do+s]. These initially-expected cash shortfalls can then be subtracted from the numerator. The 
resultant equation, which links the transaction price to initially-expected credit losses written in terms of 

















  .                                                                        (3) 
Because vo is the same in equation (3) and equation (2) and the numerator is smaller in equation (3) than 
in equation (2) for at least some future years (o+s), the IEIR must be lower than the CEIR. The difference 
between interest at the CEIR and the lower amount of interest revenue that is recognized based on the 
IEIR is credited to a loss-allowance account against which losses are charged off. The net interest revenue 
of each accounting period is reported as gross interest revenue, at the effective rate based on expected cash 
flows before deducting initially-expected credit losses, less the portion of initially-expected losses 
allocated to that period. Accrual of interest at the lower credit-loss-inclusive IEIR rather than at the CEIR 
is consistent with recognition of initially-expected credit losses being spread over asset life. This spreading 
addresses to some extent the problem arising under incurred loss that, because recognition of initially-
expected credit losses must await a loss event, credit-premium-inclusive interest might be recognized 
before associated initially-expected losses are recognized (IASB 2009, paragraph BC11). 
Appendix B includes an example of the recognition over asset life of initially-expected credit 
losses under the IEIR method. In this example, the CEIR is ten percent and the IEIR is 7.94 percent. Table 
 
13 Our algebraic exposition could be generalized to include purchased loans, in which case vo would be the purchase price. 
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B.2 shows that the net income recognized on the loans in each year, comprising contractual interest, the 
allocation of initially-expected losses and the unwind of the discount on the previously recognized loss 
allowance, is always 7.94 percent of the opening amortized-cost net book value (ACNBV) of the loans.14 
Figure B.1 in Appendix B shows that, relative to incurred loss, the IEIR-based spreading method is likely 
to accelerate loss recognition early in the portfolio's life but to delay it later.  
As the question of whether recognition of initially-expected losses should be spread across time 
was a significant source of FASB/IASB disagreement, we analyze views on both the general issue of 
spreading and the IEIR method.15 We analyze non-U.S. responses to the following recommendations: 
• Recommendation 1: Spreading the recognition of initially-expected credit losses over the life of 
assets; 
• Recommendation 2: Spreading the recognition of initially-expected credit losses over the life of 
assets using an integrated effective interest rate (IEIR) that includes initially-expected credit losses. 
Table 3 Panel A reports widespread support among non-U.S. respondents overall for spreading the 
recognition of initially-expected credit losses over the life of assets: 66 percent are for it and 14 percent 
are against it. There is a similar split among preparers and non-preparers. From the regression results, 
negative views on the usefulness ground (among non-preparers), the objectivity ground (among all 
respondents and preparers), the other-conceptual-issues ground (among all respondents, preparers and 
non-preparers) and the allowance-adequacy ground (among preparers) are significantly associated with 
the relatively minor opposition to the recommendation. 
In contrast, Table 3 Panel B reports widespread opposition to the IEIR-based spreading method: 
62 percent are against it and 34 percent are for it. Opposition to the recommendation is substantially more 
widespread among preparers (77 percent) than among non-preparers (44 percent). From the regression 
 
14 In order to harmonize the presentation of all methods considered, our IEIR example includes within 'loss' the amounts of 
initially-expected losses allocated to each year.  
15 Questions posed in IASB (2009) had the effect of inviting comment not only on the IEIR-based method but also on the 
general issue of the spreading of the recognition of initially-expected credit losses over the life of assets.  
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results, negative views on the grounds of practicability and usefulness (among all respondents and 
preparers) and other conceptual issues (among all respondents, preparers and non-preparers) are 
significantly associated with opposition to the recommendation. Practicability (overall 80 percent 
negative) and usefulness (overall 41 percent negative) are each cited negatively by more than 50 percent 
of one or more type of respondent.  
 
FASB (2010) 
FASB (2010) addressed various financial-instrument issues.16 For credit losses, it recommended 
removal of the pre-existing 'probable' threshold for loss recognition. It had a stronger allowance-adequacy 
focus than IASB (2009). It recommended that an entity should recognize a credit loss immediately for all 
contractual amounts due for originated financial assets that it does not expect to collect (FASB 2010, 
paragraph 51). This implies that, at origination of a financial asset on market terms that take account of 
initially-expected credit losses, a loss and related allowance are immediately established (at 'day one') for 
all credit losses expected on the asset over its life. If losses are measured by discounted-cash-flow (DCF), 
where the discount rate is the CEIR, the post-day-one-loss ACNBV of a portfolio of loans at origination 
date (o) (day one) is: 



































                                                       (4) 
where acnbv denotes ACNBV and the other terms are as previously defined.17  The day-one loss is  
1









+ . Expression (4) represents in two ways a conceptual flaw in the day-one 
 
16 Among other things, it recommended that most financial instruments would be measured at fair value. Fair value of assets 
previously measured at amortized cost would be reported as amortized cost net book value plus/minus fair-value adjustments. 
17 The FASB recommendations considered in this paper do not require credit-loss impairment to be measured using DCF. 
However, they require that, if credit-loss impairment is measured using DCF, the discount rate must be the CEIR. 
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recognition of initially-expected credit losses on loans originated at fair value: the first line states that a 
net-of-credit-loss numerator from (3) is discounted at a gross-of-credit-loss discount rate from (2); the 
second line states that the post-day-one-loss ACNBV at time 0 is less than the fair-value transaction price. 
Substitution of (3) into the second line of (4) represents the conceptual flaw in another way:  
1 1
[ ] [ ]
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                                (5) 
In this representation, the initially-expected credit losses are double-counted within the ACNBV at day 
one: they are deducted once within the fair-value transaction price and again through the day-one loss.18  
Appendix B includes an example of the day-one recognition of all initially-expected lifetime 
losses. Note 5 to Table B.1 in Appendix B illustrates the double-counting of initially-expected losses at 
time 0 that is depicted in (5). Table B.2 shows that, after the day-one loss of Currency Units (CU) 5.80 
reduces the time 0 ACNBV from CU100.00 to CU94.20, yearly net income on the loans, comprising 
contractual interest less unwind of discount on the allowance, is constant at the CEIR of ten percent of 
opening ACNBV. Appendix B Figure B.1 shows that loss recognition is earlier under FASB (2010) than 
IASB (2009). Although day-one recognition of all expected losses might be seen as beneficial in 
preventing any conceptually-flawed recognition of credit-premium-inclusive interest before associated 
initially-expected losses are recognized, it might also be seen as recognizing 'too much too soon'. 
We analyze U.S. responses to the following recommendation:  
Recommendation 3: Recognition at each reporting date of an allowance for all full-contractual-life 
expected credit losses. 
Table 4 reports widespread opposition among U.S. respondents overall to recognition of an 
allowance for all full-contractual-life expected credit losses: 74 percent are against it and five percent are 
for it. It reports particularly widespread opposition among preparers-CB&CU (82 percent against). It also 
 
18 As total credit losses recognized over the whole life of a portfolio of loans must be the same under any accounting method, 
any alleged over-provision for losses at day one because of double-counting at day one must be reversed subsequently.   
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reports substantial but less widespread opposition among preparers-non-CB&CU (49 percent against). 
From the regression results, negative views on the grounds of practicability (among all respondents, 
preparers-all, preparers-non-CB&CU and preparers-CB&CU), objectivity (among non-preparers), day-
one loss (among all respondents, preparers-all, preparers-non-CB&CU and non-preparers) and other 
conceptual issues (among preparers-non-CB&CU and non-preparers) are significantly associated with 
opposition to the recommendation. Practicability (overall 66 percent negative) is cited negatively by more 
than 50 percent of one or more type of respondent. 
  
FASB/IASB (2011) and the Subsequent Three-Bucket Deliberations 
After exposure of their different initial recommendations, the FASB and the IASB issued a joint 
supplementary document (FASB/IASB 2011). This was aimed at achieving a compromise converged 
solution that would partly satisfy both the FASB's allowance-adequacy objective and the IASB's IEIR-
based spreading objective (FASB/IASB 2011, paragraphs IN3-IN13).19 The operationally challenging 
IEIR method was dropped from consideration. As in FASB (2010), the 'probable' threshold was removed. 
It was recommended that the information set for determining expected credit losses should include 
'reasonable and supportable forecasts of future events and economic conditions' (FASB/IASB 2011, 
paragraph IN11). Similar wording was used in subsequent FASB and IASB EDs and standards.  
The key recommendations in the joint FASB/IASB (2011) were that:  
• assets would be allocated to a good book or a bad book; 
• for the good book, the loss allowance at each reporting date would be the higher of (i) a time-
proportional allowance (TPA)20 and (ii) a 'minimum allowance balance, or floor', including at 
 
19In the Norwalk agreement of September 2002, the FASB and the IASB had committed to developing high-quality compatible 
accounting standards. See: https://www.fasb.org/resources/ccurl/443/883/memorandum.pdf. For a 2008 summary of 
convergence topics in this initiative, see: https://www.fasb.org/intl/MOU_09-11-08.pdf . These included Financial Instruments. 
20 The TPA would be equal to all credit losses expected for the remaining portfolio life either (i) multiplied by the portfolio's 
age as a proportion of its expected life or (ii) accumulated by an annuity method. The TPA would relate both to initially-
expected losses and to losses expected as a result of later changes in estimates (FASB/IASB 2011, paragraph BC 46).  
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day one, to cover losses expected within a foreseeable future period of no less than 12 months 
(FFPA);  
• for the bad book, all expected losses would be recognized at each reporting date.21 
The good-book/bad-book distinction, allowing partial provisioning for the good book, is an IASB-
preferred feature. For the good book, FASB/IASB (2011, paragraph IN12) saw the TPA, which is a 
simplified spreading method, as addressing the IASB (2009) objective to reflect the relationship between 
pricing and expected losses described in our equation (3). It saw the FFPA as addressing the FASB (2010) 
allowance-adequacy objective. Responses of FASB and IASB constituents to these recommendations are 
relevant to understanding impediments to convergence on accounting for credit losses.  
We analyze non-U.S. responses and U.S. responses to the following recommendations: 
Recommendation 4: A good-book/bad-book distinction;  
Recommendation 5: For financial assets in the good book, an allowance comprising time-proportional 
expected credit losses (TPA); 
Recommendation 6: For financial assets in the good book, an allowance comprising credit losses 
expected to occur within the foreseeable future period (FFPA).22 
Table 5 Panels A, B and C report results for recommendations 4, 5 and 6, respectively, for non-
U.S. respondents. Panel A reports widespread support among non-U.S. respondents overall for a good-
book/bad-book distinction (86 percent for and 10 percent against). It reports similarly widespread support 
among both types of respondent. From the regression results, negative views on the practicability ground 
(among all respondents, preparers and non-preparers) and the other-conceptual-issues ground (among all 
respondents and preparers) are significantly associated with the minor opposition to the recommendation. 
 
21 Another possible route to compromise between the FASB- preferred day-one recognition of initially-expected lifetime losses 
and the IASB-preferred IEIR-based spreading of their recognition over the whole life of an asset would be to spread recognition 
over a number of years early in the asset's life. Such a method was not recommended in FASB/IASB (2011) or subsequently. 
22 Although FASB/IASB (2011) recommended TPA and FFPA as elements of a 'higher-of' method, respondents commonly 
expressed preference for or against TPA and/or FFPA in themselves. We treat TPA and FFPA as individual recommendations.   
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Panel B reports widespread support among non-U.S. respondents overall for the TPA (76 percent for and 
19 percent against), with similar levels of support among both types of respondent. From the regression 
results, negative views on the practicability ground (among all respondents, preparers and non-preparers) 
and the other-conceptual-issues ground (among all respondents and preparers) are significantly associated 
with the minor opposition to the recommendation. Panel C reports higher opposition to the FFPA than 
support for it among non-U.S. respondents overall (44 percent for and 52 percent against), with a similar 
split among preparers and non-preparers. From the regression results, negative views on the practicability, 
day-one-loss and other-conceptual-issues grounds are significantly associated with opposition to the 
recommendation among all respondents, preparers and non-preparers, with objectivity also significant for 
preparers. 
Table 5 Panels D, E and F report results for recommendations 4, 5 and 6, respectively, for U.S. 
respondents. Panel D reports that the level of support for a good-book/bad-book distinction is lower among 
U.S. respondents overall (49 percent for and 43 percent against) than among non-U.S. respondents. A 
relatively even split of opinion is observed among types of respondent other than the small number of 
preparers-CB&CU. Due to small numbers of observations, regression models for U.S. preparers-CB&CU 
and U.S. non-preparers are not estimated separately for the FASB/IASB (2011) recommendations. From 
the regression models that we estimate for U.S. respondents for the good-book/bad-book recommendation, 
negative views on the practicability ground are significantly associated with opposition to the 
recommendation among all respondents, preparers-all and preparers-non-CB&CU.23 Panel E reports that 
support for the TPA is substantially lower among U.S. respondents overall (26 percent for and 64 percent 
against) than among non-U.S. respondents. A similar split is observed among all types of respondent. 
From the regression models, negative views on the practicability and other-conceptual-issues grounds are 
 
23 The coefficient on objectivity is negative and significant at the 10 percent level for all respondents. This is one of two cases 
where a significant negative coefficient is reported in this paper. We do not comment further on these cases. 
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significantly associated with opposition to the recommendation among all respondents, preparers-all and 
preparers-non-CB&CU. Panel F reports a more favorable view of the FFPA among U.S. respondents 
overall (56 percent for and 35 percent against) than among non-U.S. respondents. There is a similar split 
among the 49 preparers-non-CB&CU, but there are majorities against among the small numbers of 
preparers-CB&CU and non-preparers. From the regression results, negative views on the practicability 
ground are significantly associated with opposition to the recommendation among all respondents, 
preparers-all and preparers-non-CB&CU. 
Overall, preferences of FASB and IASB constituents were consistent with those of their standard-
setters. In particular, relative to non-U.S. respondents, U.S. respondents were less supportive of the 
spreading-focused TPA element of the method and more supportive of the allowance-adequacy-focused 
FFPA element. This difference between constituents' relative preferences for allowance-adequacy-focused 
and spreading-focused elements indicates an impediment to convergence on accounting for credit losses. 
Joint FASB/IASB deliberations subsequent to feedback on FASB/IASB (2011) considered a so-
called three-bucket approach. The deliberations eventually produced the following proposal:24 
• at initial recognition, financial assets are placed in bucket 1, for which the loss allowance at each 
date including at day one comprises 12-month expected losses; 
• assets with a more-than-insignificant decrease in credit quality after initial recognition move to a 
lifetime-loss-allowance bucket: bucket 2 (evaluated by group) or bucket 3 (evaluated individually). 
Deliberations on the three-bucket method indicate that differences between pre-existing practices 
impeded convergence. A FASB/IASB meeting in July 2011 discussed the proposed 12-month allowance, 
including at day one, for non-credit-deteriorated assets.25 An IASB member and a FASB member opposed 
 
24 See a paper for an IASB/FASB Meeting on July 15-19, 2012 - Agenda References 5A (IASB) and 166 (FASB) for agenda 
item Financial Instruments: Impairment. Available at: https://www.ifrs.org/projects/completed-projects/2014/financial-
instruments-impairment/#meetings. 
25 A recording of this meeting was accessed at: http://archive.ifrs.org/Current-Projects/IASB-Projects/Financial-Instruments-
A-Replacement-of-IAS-39-Financial-Instruments-Recognitio/Impairment/Pages/Board-discussion-and-papers-stage-6.aspx 
(last accessed March 10, 2021). 
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it from opposite directions. The IASB member saw it as excessive: a day-one loss allowance on an asset 
originated on market terms is acceptable for bank regulation but not for accounting. The FASB member 
saw it as insufficient: it would not increase the inadequate loss allowances in the U.S. An IASB meeting 
in October 2012 referred to U.S. bank regulators' concern that a three-bucket method that would increase 
loss allowances outside the U.S. might reduce them in the U.S. 26  The following pre-existing-practice 
impediments to convergence were noted in IASB (2014, paragraph BC5.116): (i) pre-existing practice on 
loss allowances was different in the U.S. and elsewhere; (ii) historically, interaction between prudential 
regulation and loss allowances was relatively strong in the U.S.; (iii) U.S. financial-statements users place 
a relatively high weight on allowance adequacy. FASB (2016, paragraph BC129) made similar points. 
In Summer 2012, the FASB discontinued its collaboration with the IASB on the three-bucket 
method. It then embarked on the exploration of an expected-loss model that would reflect all credit risk. 
This exploration led to the method subsequently recommended in FASB (2012).27 The IASB carried the 
three-bucket method forward into IASB (2013). 
 
FASB (2012)  
FASB (2012) recommended the Current Expected Credit Loss (CECL) model.28 Similar to FASB 
(2010), this required recognition, including at day one, of all losses expected to occur over the full 
contractual life of financial assets.29 We analyze U.S. responses to the following recommendation:  
Recommendation 7: Recognition at each reporting date of an allowance for all full-contractual-life 
expected credit losses. 
 
26 A recording of this meeting is available at: http://media.ifrs.org/AP4Impairment18102012.mp3.  
27 FASB (2012, paragraph BC11) cited the claim that the three-bucket method's criterion for transfer from a 12-month-expected-
loss bucket to a lifetime-expected-loss bucket would reintroduce an incurred-loss recognition trigger for lifetime losses. 
28 The FASB (2010) recommendation that most financial instruments would be measured at fair value had been dropped. The 
term 'CECL' is not used in FASB (2012) but the method exposed in FASB (2012) is referred to as CECL in FASB (2016).  
29 FASB (2012) recommended that, for a purchased financial asset assessed by the acquirer to be purchased-credit-impaired, 
no day-one loss would be recognized. At the date of purchase, the cost basis is increased by the amount of an allowance for 
contractual cash flows not expected to be collected. The allowance is then subtracted from the grossed-up amount. Day-one 
loss can still arise on purchased assets if they are not assessed to be purchased-credit-impaired.  
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Results reported in Table 6 indicate that, despite evidence of a relatively strong allowance-
adequacy preference among U.S. respondents to FASB/IASB (2011), there was widespread opposition 
among U.S. respondents to the FASB (2012) allowance for all full-contractual-life expected credit losses. 
85 percent are against it and 12 percent are for it. There are large majorities against among preparers-non-
CB&CU and preparers-CB&CU, with less opposition among non-preparers. Because only one of the 165 
preparers-CB&CU is not against the recommendation, we do not estimate a separate regression model for 
preparers-CB&CU. Negative views on the grounds of practicability (among all respondents, preparers-all 
and preparers-non-CB&CU), usefulness (among all respondents and non-preparers), objectivity (among 
preparers-all), day-one loss (among all respondents, preparers-all and non-preparers), other conceptual 
issues (among non-preparers) and regulatory capital (among all respondents and preparers-all) are 
significantly associated with opposition to the recommendation.30 A relatively large number of grounds 
are cited negatively by more than 50 percent of one or more type of respondent: practicability (overall 84 
percent negative), objectivity (overall 53 percent negative), day-one loss (overall 47 percent negative) and 
regulatory capital (overall 33 percent negative). 
We examine what the 85 percent of U.S. respondents to FASB (2012) who were against 
recognition of an allowance for all full-contractual-life expected credit losses might have preferred instead. 
We consider two candidates: an incurred-loss method and a three-bucket or similar method. We treat as 
supportive of incurred loss those responses that supported the existing incurred-loss method or a modified 
version. Table 7 reports that, of the 85 percent of respondents that were against recommendation 7, 57 
percent supported some form of incurred-loss method and eight percent supported the three-bucket 
method, with a small number favorably mentioning both. Preferences are similar across all types of 
respondent. Of responses supportive of incurred loss, 40 percent indicated support for a modified incurred-
 
30 The coefficient on overstatement is negative and significant at the five percent level for non-preparers. This is one of two 
cases where a significant negative coefficient is reported in this paper. We do not comment further on these cases 
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loss method, typically with less restrictive more forward-looking evidence requirements.31 The percentage 
of U.S. respondents to FASB (2012) that were against recognition of an allowance for all full-contractual-
life expected losses and supportive of some form of incurred-loss method is 48 percent (= 57 percent times 
85 percent). This substantially exceeds the 12 percent that were for CECL's full-contractual-life allowance.  
Overall, among U.S. respondents to FASB (2012), there was substantial opposition to recognition 
of an allowance for all full-contractual-life expected losses. Reference to Table 4 suggests that opposition 
strengthened between FASB (2010) and FASB (2012).32 Responses to FASB (2012) indicate substantially 
more support for some form of incurred-loss method than for the recommended method.  
The main recommendations of FASB (2012) were carried forward into the FASB's Accounting 
Standards Update on credit losses (FASB 2016). The effective dates of FASB (2016) were originally: 
fiscal years beginning after December 15, 2019 for public business entities that are SEC filers; fiscal years 
beginning after December 15, 2020 for public business entities that are not SEC filers and for all other 
entities. The inclusion within FASB (2016) of the CECL method, largely as proposed, after such 
widespread comment-letter opposition suggests that factors other than the weight of opinion in comment 
letters were influential in the evolution of that method. 
The conceptual problem with day-one recognition of expected losses gave rise to the following 
statement in a dissenting opinion from two FASB members in FASB (2016): 
Messrs. Kroeker and Smith believe that requiring an initial loss at an amount equal to expected credit 
losses contradicts the concept of neutrality that is fundamental to the FASB's own Conceptual 
Framework. They are unaware of any other area of financial reporting for which a loss and a related 
valuation allowance are immediately established to reduce the value of a recognized asset that is 
purchased or originated on market terms. Messrs. Kroeker and Smith agree that in the unusual 
circumstance in which a financial asset is purchased at a price that exceeds fair value or is originated 
 
31 Within responses supportive of a modified incurred-loss method, we include those that supported the Banking Industry Model 
(BIM) proposed by the American Bankers Association (ABA). In its comment letter on FASB/IASB (2011) (letter number 
143), the ABA argued that 'the fundamental principles inherent in the incurred loss model are sound'. In describing its BIM in 
its comment letter on FASB (2012) (letter number 39A), the ABA argued that credit-loss impairment should continue to be 
based on loss events that have occurred but that the definition of loss events should be expanded to include 'forward-looking 
loss events'. 46 percent of responses that we treat as supportive of a modified incurred-loss method supported the BIM. 
32 Between the issue of the FASB (2012) ED and FASB (2016), the FASB attempted to address concerns about the practicability 
of CECL. However, a FASB roundtable meeting on February 4, 2016 showed that Community Banks still had serious concerns 
about the forecasting requirements of CECL. At that meeting, FASB representatives sought to allay those concerns.  
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with an initial interest rate that is too low considering the degree of credit risk, an initial loss and 
measurement of the asset at an amount below the transaction price likely would be appropriate; in 
fact, they believe that would be the appropriate accounting under today's incurred loss model. This 
conceptual shortcoming in the Update may lead some readers to conclude that the Board had a 
specific prudential policy objective when it approved it. (FASB 2016, page 237) 
 
IASB (2013) 
IASB (2013) recommended a three-bucket method, with the three buckets now termed 'Stage 1', 
'Stage 2' and 'Stage 3'. Stage 1 contains assets without significant increase in credit risk since initial 
recognition. For these assets, the loss allowance including at day one comprises 12-month expected credit 
losses, defined as lifetime expected losses from default events possible within 12 months after the 
reporting date weighted by the probability of occurrence of those events.33 Assets for which there is a 
significant increase in credit risk move to a Stage for which lifetime expected losses are recognized: Stage 
2, for assets without objective evidence of impairment, or Stage 3, for assets with objective evidence of 
impairment. The IASB acknowledged that the Stage-1 12-month allowance with its day-one loss would 
understate asset values at initial recognition (IASB 2013, paragraph BC66), but saw it as acceptable on 
the basis that it was an expedient for the IEIR method (IASB 2013, pages 7-8). Appendix B includes a 
simplified example of the recognition of initially-expected credit losses under the IASB (2013) method. 
This example treats default events and significant increases in credit risk as a single class of event termed 
'forward-looking loss events', which are identified by reference to the less restricted more forward-looking 
information set. In this example, relative to incurred loss, the more forward-looking information set brings 
loss events forward by one year and the 12-month allowance brings recognition forward by one more year. 
IASB deliberations on IASB (2013) included expressions of concern about the 12-month day-one 
loss, prompting the following comment from the IASB Chair at a December 2012 IASB meeting:34  
 
33 IASB (2013) recommended that, for a purchased financial asset with objective evidence of impairment, no day-one loss 
would be recognized. A pre-existing IEIR-type method that had been required for such assets by IASB (2003) was retained in 
IASB (2013). Day-one loss can still arise on purchased assets if they are not classified as purchased-credit-impaired.  
34 A recording of the meeting is available at: http://media.ifrs.org/2012/IASBMeetings/December/ImpairmentAR5141212.mp3  
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[…] I do recollect that the whole board had a severe hiccup about this 12-month day-one loss. We 
didn't like it because it is conceptually flawed, and we know that, but we were willing to […] take 
that, first of all because we were in the process of reaching some kind of convergence with the 
FASB. Well, that moment has unfortunately passed, but we were where we were and it was not very 
simple to come up with a simple and better solution for this issue […] There are conceptual issues. 
Fortunately, quantitatively our conceptual flaw is a lot smaller than […] the current FASB proposal 
[…]. (Verbal comment) 
 
This comment indicates that the IASB's initial acceptance of a conceptually-flawed 12-month day-one 
loss was in part motivated by the hope that this might facilitate FASB/IASB convergence. Conceptual 
concern about day-one loss was expressed in an alternative view from an IASB member: 
[…] the loss allowance at an amount equal to 12-month expected credit losses is contradictory to 
the IASB’s own Conceptual Framework, given that the result is not neutral and it fails to faithfully 
represent the transaction. In no other area of financial reporting is an allowance immediately 
established to reduce the value of an asset that is purchased or originated on market terms. (IASB 
2013, paragraph AV2) 
 
The following comment by the IASB chair indicates a fundamental FASB/IASB disagreement regarding 
the acceptable amount of day-one loss, which impeded convergence on accounting for credit losses: 
In developing this standard, the IASB did consider whether to require banks to recognise full lifetime 
losses from day one. We rejected this approach for several reasons. First, accounting standards are 
designed to reflect economic reality as closely as possible. Banks do not suffer losses on the very 
first day a loan has been made, so recording a full lifetime loss immediately is counter-intuitive. 
Moreover, in bad economic times, when earnings are already depressed, banks would have an 
incentive to cut back on new lending in order to avoid having to recognise large day one losses. Just 
when you need it most, the economy would probably be starved of credit. Second, future losses are 
notoriously difficult to predict, so any model based on expected losses many years later would be 
subjective. (Hoogervorst 2018) 
 
We analyze non-U.S. responses to the following recommendations: 
Recommendation 8: Recognition of an allowance for 12-month expected credit losses for assets for 
which credit risk has not increased significantly since initial recognition. 
Recommendation 9: Recognition of an allowance for lifetime expected credit losses for assets for 
which credit risk has increased significantly since initial recognition.  
Table 8 Panel A reports widespread support among non-U.S. respondents overall for the 12-month Stage-
1 allowance. 72 percent are for it and 23 percent are against it, with a similar split among preparers and 
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non-preparers. From the regression results, negative views on the grounds of practicability (among all 
respondents and preparers), usefulness and day-one loss (among all respondents), allowance adequacy 
(among non-preparers) and allowance overstatement (among all respondents and preparers) are 
significantly associated with the minor opposition to the recommendation. Day-one loss (overall 51 
percent negative) is cited negatively by more than 50 percent of respondents. The surprising combination 
in comment letters of widespread support for the 12-month allowance and widespread negative views on 
its day-one-loss feature was also noted by an IASB member at a September 2013 FASB/IASB meeting.35 
Table 8 Panel B reports that support for recognition of lifetime loss after significant increase in 
credit risk is very similar to that for the 12-month Stage-1 allowance. From the regression results, negative 
views on the practicability and other-conceptual-issues grounds (among all respondents, preparers and 
non-preparers) and on the allowance-adequacy ground (among all respondents and non-preparers) are 
significantly associated with the minor opposition to the recommendation.  
Overall, non-U.S. respondents largely supported the 12-month allowance with transfer to lifetime 
loss after significant increase in credit risk, despite widespread negative views about the day-one-loss 
requirement. Comparison of Table 5 Panel C with Table 8 Panel A suggests that non-U.S. respondents' 
support for recognition of foreseeable-future-period good-book losses, through the FFPA or the 12-month 
allowance, strengthened between FASB/IASB (2011) and IASB (2013). The three-stage method was 
carried forward into IASB (2014), effective for annual periods beginning on or after January 1, 2018. 
 
Untabulated Robustness Tests and Additional Tests  
We test if regression-based inferences about grounds are robust to the use of five percent or ten 
percent cut-offs for the percentage of negatives instead of a three percent cut-off. Our principal inferences 
are not affected by the results from these tests.  
 
35 A recording of this meeting is available at:  http://media.ifrs.org/2013/IASB/September/Impairment_AR5_Session1.mp3.  
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We investigate the possibility that inferences for the FASB-only EDs and the IASB-only EDs 
might differ under a more exclusive definition of the standard-setters' respective constituents. For IASB 
(2009) and FASB (2010) and for FASB (2012) and IASB (2013), we repeat our tests excluding for each 
ED all respondents that also comment on the approximately contemporaneous ED of the other standard-
setter. These untabulated tests give results that are similar to those that we report.  
We report evidence that U.S. respondents' opposition to the full-contractual-life allowance 
strengthened between FASB (2010) and FASB (2012) and that non-U.S. respondents' support for a 
foreseeable-future-period or 12-month allowance strengthened between FASB/IASB (2011) and IASB 
(2013). We test whether these inferences are robust to comparison of responses from respondents that 
responded, in each case, to both exposure documents. The inferences are robust to these comparisons. 
Our comment-letter data set includes seven international accounting firms, which are not 
categorized as non-U.S. or U.S. and are categorized as 'other respondents'. These are not included in our 
tabulated tests. Here, we summarize the patterns of responses of these respondents. For IASB (2009), the 
pattern of responses is similar to that of non-U.S. respondents overall: most favor spreading but most 
oppose the IEIR method of achieving this. For FASB (2010) and FASB (2012), responses are similar to 
those of U.S. respondents overall: most oppose a full-contractual-life loss allowance. For FASB/IASB 
(2011), responses resemble those of non-U.S. respondents: the TPA is more favorably viewed than the 
FFPA. For IASB (2013), similar to non-U.S. respondents overall, most support the key recommendations.  
 
V. SUBSEQUENT EVENTS RELATING TO FASB (2016) 
Controversy regarding the FASB's CECL method continued in years after FASB (2016) was 
issued. On December 11, 2018, a U.S. House of Representatives hearing assessed the impact of CECL on 
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U.S. financial institutions and the U.S. economy. 36 A Representative and witnesses expressed concern 
about the logic of CECL's requirement for recognition of full-contractual-life expected losses, including 
at day one, and its possible adverse effects on incentives to lend. Witnesses commented on the operational 
complexity of CECL. There were calls from a Representative and a witness to delay CECL so that its 
likely impact could be assessed. There were calls from a Representative and a witness to abandon CECL 
for all or some entities. In mid-2019, related bills about CECL were introduced in the U.S. Senate and 
House of Representatives.37 These would delay implementation of CECL and require quantitative study 
of its effects on the availability of credit, on U.S. financial institutions and on the U.S. economy. In 
November 2019, FASB (2019) delayed the effective date of CECL for all entities other than large SEC 
filers to fiscal years beginning after December 15, 2022.38 On January 15, 2020, proceedings of a U.S. 
House of Representatives hearing on oversight of standard-setters were dominated by questioning of the 
FASB Chair about CECL.39 Several Representatives expressed concern about the likely damaging effects 
of increased CECL loss allowances on consumers' access to credit and about the cost to banks of 
implementing CECL. One Representative criticized 'up-front' recognition of losses. Representatives 
expressed surprise that the FASB had not studied more fully the likely effects of CECL before issuing 
FASB (2016). These events are consistent with the comment-letter opposition to the FASB (2012) lifetime 
loss allowance that we report. In March 2020, the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act 
gave all U.S. banks a time-limited opt-out from implementation of CECL. 
 
36 Hearing before the Subcommittee on Financial Institutions and Consumer Credit of the Committee on Financial Services of 
the U.S. House of Representatives on the subject of 'Assessing the Impact of FASB's Current Expected Credit Loss (CECL) 
Accounting Standard on Financial institutions and the Economy', December 11, 2018. A written record of the hearing is 
available at: https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=821840. 
37 On May 21, 2019, the Continued Encouragement for Consumer Lending Act bill was introduced in the U.S. Senate. On June 
10, 2019, the related CECL Consumer Impact and Study Bill of 2019 was introduced in the U.S. House of Representatives. The 
Senate bill is available at: https://www.congress.gov/116/bills/s1564/BILLS-116s1564is.pdf . 
The House of Representatives bill is available at https://congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-bill/3182/text . 
38 FASB (2018) had previously delayed the effective date for entities other than public business entities to December 15, 2021. 
39  Hearing of the Subcommittee on Investor Protection, Entrepreneurship, and Capital Markets of the U.S. House of 
Representatives Committee on Financial Services on the subject of 'Overseeing the Standard Setters: An Examination of the 
Financial Accounting Standards Board and the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board', January 15, 2020. A recording 




VI. COULD THE STANDARD-SETTERS HAVE AVOIDED DAY-ONE LOSS? 
 
  Day-one recognition of expected credit losses on assets originated on market terms was adopted 
within the FASB's CECL method because the FASB followed an expected-loss path that would require 
an allowance for all expected credit losses at every reporting date. It initially entered the IASB's 
recommendations because, having initially followed an IEIR-based expected-loss path, the IASB accepted 
a limited amount of day-one loss within a method that would serve as an expedient for the IEIR-based 
method and might provide a basis for FASB/IASB convergence. After the failure to achieve convergence, 
the IASB retained a limited amount of day-one loss within an expedient for the IEIR-based method.  
 As described in earlier sections, the issue of day-one recognition of credit losses on assets 
originated on market terms is controversial. Day-one loss is conceptually-flawed in that it double-counts 
initially-expected losses within the net book value of assets at the date of initial recognition. We report 
that it was influential in driving comment-letter opposition to the final recommendations of both standard-
setters. It was opposed on fundamental conceptual grounds by members of the standard-setting boards. It 
was cited in criticism of CECL in the U.S. Congress. Disagreement on day-one loss was influential in 
impeding a converged solution on accounting for credit losses. 
 Arguments in favor of day-one recognition of credit losses include the following, which are 
referred to in FASB (2016, paragraphs BC39-BC43): (i) methods that recognize initially-expected losses 
across time rather than at day one might make incorrect assumptions about the time at which initially-
expected credit losses will arise, and might thereby delay the recognition of such losses; (ii) methods that 
do not recognize all expected losses at day one require identification of a recognition trigger, which 
introduces complexity and subjectivity; (iii) methods that do not recognize all expected losses at day one 
may contribute to procyclicality through subsequent large increases in loss allowances. Other arguments 
include: (i) origination of a loan creates exposure to losses, which should be recognized immediately; (ii) 
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establishment of loss allowances at day one helps achieve appropriate provisioning for bad loans 
originated in favorable economic times when loans are growing rapidly.40 IASB (2013) saw day-one 
recognition of 12-month expected losses as part of an expedient for the IEIR method. Pucci and Skærbæk  
(2020, page 13) quote an argument from an IASB staff member that recognition of day-one losses, limited 
to 12 months, can be justified because of likely imprecision in the pricing of initially-expected credit 
losses. These arguments see day-one loss on assets originated on market terms as a practically-expedient 
means of compensating for possible under-recognition of expected losses in transaction prices or in loss 
allowances, or of avoiding complexity or subjectivity or cliff edges, or of approximating outcomes from 
a conceptually supportable method. They do not provide a conceptual basis for it. 
  The lack of a conceptual basis for day-one loss and the controversy surrounding it suggest that 
day-one loss might ideally have been avoided. The standard-setters could have followed a day-one-loss-
free path to making the accounting for credit losses more timely by highlighting from the outset that all 
methods of accounting for credit losses, including incurred loss, require some use of credit-loss-relevant 
expectations.41 Based on this, it could be argued that the problem with the incurred-loss method before 
the financial crisis might not have been the concept of incurred loss itself but restrictions on the extent to 
which credit-loss-relevant expectations could be included in the information set used to determine whether 
credit losses had been incurred. Expressed in that way, the problem could be addressed through a modified 
more forward-looking incurred-loss method as follows: (i) financial assets originated on market terms are 
 
40 The letter from Carlson Capital, L.P. in response to FASB (2010) (letter number 1296) refers to both of these arguments. 
41 See the examples of loss events under the IASB (2003) incurred-loss method that we list in Section II. Also, at a FASB/IASB 
meeting in July 2013, a FASB member referred to what he saw as the unhelpful distinction between 'incurred' and 'expected':    
I think we have miscommunicated significantly through this whole process about expected versus incurred losses. I 
think we could all agree that an incurred loss is realized when you don't collect the cash and you have given up 
collecting on the cash, and we don't wait to recognize losses to that charge-off point. So almost everything in any 
model we do is an expectation, and the question is going to be what are the events or the information that triggers us 
to recognize that expectation. And I think we don't serve well the communication about this at all to put an incurred 
versus expected. We need to define what it is that are either the loss events that cause us to measure some sort of 
expectation or the information set. (Verbal comment) 




recognized at transaction price, with no day-one loss; (ii) a less restricted more forward-looking 
information set than that used by the pre-existing incurred-loss method, similar to that used by the 
expected-loss methods outlined in Section III, is then used in determining whether initially-expected credit 
losses and credit losses arising from changes relative to initial expectations have been incurred. Such a 
method would give earlier recognition of credit losses than the pre-existing incurred-loss method without 
requiring day-one loss. Lowering the loss-recognition hurdle would address to some extent the problem 
arising under the pre-existing incurred-loss method that recognition of credit-premium-inclusive interest 
can pre-date recognition of associated initially-expected losses. 
 Our comment-letter analysis suggests that such a route might have been preferable to a day-one-
loss-inclusive expected-loss route for the purpose of seeking a satisfactory converged improvement in the 
timeliness of accounting for credit losses. We report that FASB constituents were more supportive of some 
form of incurred-loss method than of CECL, with many advocating a more forward-looking version of 
incurred loss. We also report that, although IASB constituents largely supported the three-stage method 
adopted in IASB (2014), many expressed negative views about the day-one-loss feature of the 12-month 
allowance. In relation to this, we note that removing the 12-month allowance, with its unpopular day-one- 
loss feature, from that method would leave a method that has some similarity with a more forward-looking 
incurred-loss method. Financial assets originated on market terms would be recognized at transaction 
price, with no day-one loss; credit losses would be recognized on the occurrence of events, in the form of 
default events or significant increases in credit risk, identified by reference to an information set that is 
less restricted and more forward-looking than that used by the pre-existing incurred-loss method.42 
 
42 See also our earlier reference to FASB (2012, paragraph BC11), which cited the claim that the criteria for recognition of 
lifetime loss in the three-bucket/three-stage (12-month/lifetime loss) method would reintroduce an incurred-loss recognition 
trigger. See also our examples in Appendix B. In these admittedly simplified examples, the pattern of loss recognition under 
12-month/lifetime loss is the same as under incurred loss except that, relative to incurred loss: (i) the use of the more forward-
looking information set brings loss events forward by one year; (ii) the allowance for loss events possible in the next 12 months 
brings loss recognition forward by one more year. In these examples, removal of the 12-month allowance would leave a method 
in which the pattern of loss recognition is the same as under incurred loss except that the use of the more forward-looking 





After the financial and banking crisis of the late 2000s, the FASB and the IASB addressed concerns 
that the incurred-loss method did not provide timely recognition of credit losses. They went on to develop 
expected-loss methods. We review the development of those methods, including through analysis of 
responses to five exposure documents issued by the FASB and/or the IASB from 2009 to 2013. 
The two standard-setters readily accepted that the information set to be used to support recognition 
of credit losses should become less restricted and more forward-looking than under the pre-existing 
incurred-loss method. However, they could not agree a converged solution. Due in part to historically 
stronger interaction between prudential regulation and loss allowances in the U.S than elsewhere, the 
FASB adopted a stronger loss-allowance-adequacy focus than the IASB. It eventually recommended in 
its final ED (FASB 2012) and included in a 2016 Accounting Standards Update (FASB 2016) the CECL 
method under which an entity would establish, including at day one, a loss and a loss allowance for all 
full-contractual-life expected credit losses. The IASB preferred that initially-expected credit losses should 
be reflected in the effective rate at which interest is accrued, with their recognition thereby being spread 
over asset life. It eventually recommended in its final ED (IASB 2013) and included in a 2014 Accounting 
Standard (IASB 2014) a method which had been proposed as a compromise route to FASB/IASB 
convergence but which the FASB could not accept: from initial recognition of a financial asset, the loss 
allowance at each date, including at day one, comprises 12-month expected losses; for assets for which 
credit risk increases significantly after initial recognition, it comprises lifetime expected losses. 
Our comment-letter analysis indicates that, relative to IASB constituents, FASB constituents 
attached more importance to allowance adequacy and were less supportive of spreading the recognition 
of credit losses across time. However, FASB constituents largely opposed recommendations for a full-
contractual-life loss allowance, mainly due to concerns about practicability and day-one loss. Their 
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responses to FASB (2012) were more supportive of some form of incurred-loss method than of the CECL 
full-contractual-life loss allowance, with many advocating a more forward-looking version of incurred 
loss. IASB constituents largely supported the IASB's 12-month loss allowance with transfer to lifetime 
loss after significant increase in credit risk, despite widespread negative views about day-one loss.  
The issue of day-one recognition of credit losses on assets originated on market terms caused 
difficulty in the development of the expected-loss methods. This treatment double-counts initially-
expected losses within the net book value at the date of initial recognition. We report that it was influential 
in driving comment-letter opposition to the standard-setters' final recommendations. It was opposed in 
dissenting or alternative views by standard-setters' board members. It was cited in criticism of CECL in 
the U.S. Congress. Disagreement on day-one loss was influential in impeding FASB/IASB convergence 
on accounting for credit losses. We suggest that future research and standard-setting activity on 
accounting for credit losses might consider whether satisfactory timeliness in loss recognition might be 
achieved, without day-one loss, through a modified incurred-loss method that would use a less restricted 
more forward-looking information set for loss recognition than was permitted by the pre-existing 
incurred-loss method. Our comment-letter evidence suggests that such a method might provide a route to 




Anandarajan, A., I. Hasan, and C. McCarthy. 2007. Use of loan loss provisions for capital, earnings 
management and signalling by Australian banks. Accounting and Finance 47 (3): 357–379. 
Anantharaman, D. 2015. Understanding the evolution of SFAS 141 and 142: An analysis of comment 
letters. Research in Accounting Regulation 27 (2): 99-110. 
Balla, E., and M. Rose. 2015. Loan loss provisions, accounting constraints, and bank ownership structure. 
Journal of Economics and Business 78 (March-April): 92-117. 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS). 2006. International Convergence of Capital 
Measurement and Capital Standards: A Revised Framework - Comprehensive Version. Basel: Bank 
for International Settlements. 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS). 2009. Guiding Principles for the Replacement of IAS 
39. Basel: Bank for International Settlements. 
Beck, P., and G. Narayanamoorthy. 2013. Did the SEC impact banks' loan loss reserve policies and their 
informativeness? Journal of Accounting and Economics 56 (2-3): 42-65. 
Bouvatier, V., L. Lepetit, and F. Strobel. 2014. Bank income smoothing, ownership concentration and the 
regulatory environment. Journal of Banking and Finance 41 (April): 253-270. 
Camfferman, K. 2015. The emergence of the 'incurred-loss' model for credit losses in IAS 39. Accounting 
in Europe 12 (1): 1-35. 
Cohen, J. 1960. A coefficient of agreement for nominal scales. Educational and Psychological 
Measurement 20 (1): 37–46. 
Collins, J., D. Shackelford, and J. Wahlen. 1995. Bank differences in the coordination of regulatory 
capital, earnings, and taxes. Journal of Accounting Research 33 (2): 263-291.  
Dugan, J. 2009. Loan Loss Provisioning and Pro-cyclicality. Speech delivered before the Institute of 
International Bankers, March 2, 2009. 
32 
 
Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB). 2010. Exposure Draft: Proposed Accounting Standards 
Update. Accounting for Financial Instruments and Revisions to the Accounting for Derivative 
Instruments and Hedging Activities (May 26, 2010). Norwalk, CT: FASB. 
Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB). 2012. Exposure Draft: Proposed Accounting Standards 
Update. Financial Instruments: Credit Losses (December 20, 2012). Norwalk, CT: FASB. 
Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB). 2016. Accounting Standards Update No. 2016-13. 
Financial Instruments – Credit Losses (Topic 326): Measurement of Credit Losses on Financial 
Instruments (June 2016). Norwalk, CT: FASB. 
Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB). 2018. Accounting Standards Update No. 2018-19. 
Codification Improvements to Topic 326, Financial Instruments - Credit Losses (November 2018). 
Norwalk, CT: FASB. 
Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB). 2019. Accounting Standards Update No. 2019-10. 
Financial Instruments – Credit Losses (Topic 326), Derivatives and Hedging (Topic 815), and Leases 
(Topic 842): Effective Dates (November 2016). Norwalk, CT: FASB. 
Financial Accounting Standards Board/International Accounting Standards Board (FASB/IASB). 2011. 
Supplementary Document. Accounting for Financial Instruments and Revisions to the Accounting for 
Derivative Instruments and Hedging Activities: Impairment (January 31, 2011). Norwalk, CT: FASB; 
AND Supplement to ED/2009/12. Financial Instruments: Amortised Cost and Impairment (Financial 
Instruments: Impairment) (January 2011). London: IASB. 
Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC). 2001. Policy Statement on Allowance for 
Loan and Lease Losses Methodologies and Documentation for Banks and Savings Institutions. 
Virginia: FFIEC. 
Financial Crisis Advisory Group. 2009. Report of the Financial Crisis Advisory Group, July 28, 2009. 





Financial Stability Board. 2009. Improving Financial Regulation: Report of the Financial Stability Board 
to G20 Leaders, September 25, 2009. Basel: Financial Stability Board. Available at: 
https://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/r_090925b.pdf?page_moved=1 
Firth, D. 1993. Bias reduction of maximum likelihood estimates. Biometrika 80 (1): 27-38. 
Fonseca, A., and F. Gonzalez. 2008. Cross-country determinants of bank income smoothing by managing 
loan-loss provisions. Journal of Banking and Finance 32 (February): 217-228. 
Gebhardt, G., and Z. Novotny-Farkas. 2011. Mandatory IFRS adoption and accounting quality of 
European banks. Journal of Business Finance and Accounting 38 (3-4): 289-333. 
Giner, B., and M. Arce. 2012. Lobbying on accounting standards: evidence from IFRS 2 on share-based 
payments. European Accounting Review 21(4): 655-691. 
Hasan, I., and L. Wall. 2004. Determinants of the loan loss allowance: some cross-country comparisons. 
Financial Review 39 (1): 129-152. 
Hashim, N., W. Li, and J. O'Hanlon. 2019. Reflections on the development of the FASB's and IASB's 
expected-loss methods of accounting for credit losses. Accounting and Business Research 49 (6): 682-
725. 
Hashim, N., W. Li, and J. O'Hanlon. 2016. Expected-loss-based accounting for impairment of financial 
instruments: The FASB and IASB proposals 2009-2016. Accounting in Europe 13 (2): 229-267. 
Hodder, L., and P. Hopkins. 2014. Agency problems, accounting slack, and banks' response to proposed 
reporting of loan fair values. Accounting, Organizations and Society 39 (2): 117-133. 
Holder, A., K. Karim, K. Lin, and M. Woods. 2013. A content analysis of the comment letters to the FASB 
and IASB: Accounting for contingencies. Advances in Accounting, incorporating Advances in 
International Accounting 29 (1): 134-153 
34 
 
Hoogervorst, H. 2018. Do not blame accounting rules for the financial crisis. Financial Times October 4, 
2018: 13. 
Huizinga, H., and L. Laeven. 2012. Bank valuation and accounting discretion during a financial crisis. 
Journal of Financial Economics 106 (3): 614-634. 
International Accounting Standards Board (IASB). 2003. International Accounting Standard 39 - 
Financial Instruments: Recognition and Measurement. London: IASB. 
International Accounting Standards Board (IASB). 2009. Exposure Draft ED/2009/12. Financial 
Instruments: Amortised Cost and Impairment, (November 2009). London: IASB. 
International Accounting Standards Board (IASB). 2013. Exposure Draft ED/2013/3 Financial 
Instruments: Expected Credit Losses (March 2013). London: IASB. 
International Accounting Standards Board (IASB). 2014. IFRS 9 Financial Instruments. London: IASB. 
Kanagaretnam, K., G. Lobo, and R. Mathieu. 2003. Managerial incentives for income smoothing through 
bank loan loss provisions. Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting 20 (1): 63-80. 
Kanagaretnam, K., G. Lobo, and D. Yang. 2004. Joint tests of signaling and income smoothing through 
bank loan loss provisions. Contemporary Accounting Research 21 (4): 843-884. 
Liu, C., and S. Ryan. 2006. Income smoothing over the business cycle: changes in banks' coordinated 
management of provisions for loan losses and loan charge-offs from the pre-1990 bust to the 1990s 
boom. Accounting Review 81 (2): 421-441. 
Lobo, G., and D. Yang. 2001. Bank managers' heterogeneous decisions on discretionary loan loss 
provisions. Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting 16 (3): 223-250. 
Marton, J., and E. Runesson. 2017. The predictive ability of loan loss provisions in banks - effects of 
accounting standards, enforcement and incentives. British Accounting Review 49 (2): 162-180. 
35 
 
O'Hanlon, J., N. Hashim, and W. Li. 2018. Research Briefing - Accounting for Credit Losses: The 
Development of IFRS 9 and CECL. London: Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales 
(ICAEW) Charitable Trusts. 
Perez, D., V. Salas-Fumas, and J. Saurina. 2008. Earnings and capital management in alternative loan loss 
provision regulatory regimes. European Accounting Review 17 (3): 423-445. 
Pucci, R. and P. Skærbæk. 2020. The co-performation of financial economics in accounting standard-
setting: A study of the translation of the expected credit loss model in IFRS 9. Accounting, 
Organizations and Society 81: 1-22. 
Shrieves, R., and D. Dahl. 2003. Discretionary accounting and the behavior of Japanese banks under 
financial duress. Journal of Banking & Finance 27 (3): 1219-1243. 
Yen, A., E. Hirst, and E. Hopkins. 2007. A content analysis of the comprehensive income exposure draft 











Comment-Letter Analysis: Collection of Comment Letters and Data Preparation 
Collection of Comment Letters 
For the five exposure documents for which we analyze comment-letter responses, we obtain 
comment letters from the standard-setters' web sites.43 We exclude letters without a stated affiliation. 
Where different parts of the same organization submitted separate letters for the same exposure document, 
we merge letters into a single letter for the purpose of our analysis. For FASB (2010), which dealt with a 
number of financial-instrument issues, our initial data set includes 2,971 letters. Most of these do not refer 
to credit-loss impairment and appear to have been written as part of a coordinated campaign against the 
recommendation in FASB (2010) that most financial assets should be measured at fair value.44 For FASB 
(2010), we analyze only those letters that commented on credit-loss-impairment recommendations. 
 
Categorization of Respondents by Non-U.S./U.S./Other  
We categorize respondents by location as follows: (i) non-U.S. respondents, assumed to be actual 
or potential IASB constituents; (ii) U.S. respondents, assumed to be FASB constituents; (iii) other 
respondents. The categorization of 'non-U.S. respondents' and 'U.S. respondents' is by reference to the 
geographical source of the comment letter except for financial-statement-preparer organizations, where it 
is by reference to whether the highest-level financial statements are prepared under U.S. GAAP (U.S.) or 
 
43 The letters written in response to the exposure documents are available at the following web sites:  
• IASB (2009). Available at: https://www.ifrs.org/projects/completed-projects/2014/financial-instruments-
impairment/ed-amortised-cost-and-impairment/#view-the-comment-letters 
• FASB (2010). Available at: 
http://www.fasb.org/jsp/FASB/CommentLetter_C/CommentLetterPage&cid=1218220137090&project_id=1810-100 
• FASB/IASB (2011). Available at: 
http://www.fasb.org/jsp/FASB/CommentLetter_C/CommentLetterPage&cid=1218220137090&project_id=2011-150 
• FASB (2012). Available at:  
http://www.fasb.org/jsp/FASB/CommentLetter_C/CommentLetterPage&cid=1218220137090&project_id=2012-260 
• IASB (2013). Available at: https://www.ifrs.org/projects/completed-projects/2014/financial-instruments-
impairment/ed-expected-credit-losses/#view-the-comment-letters 
44 This coordinated campaign was also noted by Hodder and Hopkins (2014).   
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another regime (non-U.S.). 'Other respondents' comprise international accounting firms, international 
associations, international bank-regulatory organizations and other international regulatory organizations. 
Responses from 'other respondents' are not used in tabulated tests, but some are used in untabulated tests. 
 
Categorization of Respondents by Preparer/Non-preparer/Etc. 
We also categorize respondents by type as preparers of financial statements or as non-preparers. 
Because a large proportion of U.S. preparer respondents are Community Banks or Credit Unions (denoted 
CB&CU), we subdivide U.S. preparers into two types: preparers-non-CB&CU and preparers-CB&CU. 
Non-U.S preparers and U.S preparers-non-CB&CU comprise financial-firm preparers of financial 
statements, mainly banks and insurance companies, non-financial-firm preparers of financial statements, 
and relevant representative bodies. Non-U.S. non-preparers and U.S. non-preparers comprise users of 
financial statements, including investors and analysts, accounting firms and professional accounting 
bodies and associations, accounting regulators, accounting standard-setters and other accounting or 
auditing regulatory bodies, financial regulatory bodies, and relevant representative bodies. 
 
Coding of Responses 
For each recommendation, we code responses as 'for' (which includes partial support), 'against' 
and 'neutral/missing'. We record whether some specific factors regarding the recommendation are cited 
positively or negatively in the comment letter; we refer to these factors as 'grounds' on which the 
respondent could view the recommendation positively or negatively. The grounds recorded are as follows, 
where any shorthand term used in the paper is given in parentheses: practicability; usefulness; objectivity, 
including limitation on earnings management and on reliance on judgement (objectivity); conceptual 
soundness/representation of economic substance and related matters with respect to the recognition of 
day-one loss (day-one loss); conceptual soundness/representation of economic substance other than in 
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relation to day-one loss (other conceptual issues); economic consequences; effect on regulatory capital 
(regulatory capital); allowance adequacy; allowance overstatement; potential to cause sudden large 
increases in loss allowances (cliff effect). A 'for' response to a recommendation can be coded as 'negative' 
on some grounds and 'positive' on other grounds; the same holds for 'against' and 'neutral/missing' 
responses.  
The process for coding comment-letter responses was as follows. First, responses for each of the 
five exposure documents were coded by one of the three authors of this paper (the first coder). For each 
exposure document, responses ('for', 'against', 'neutral/missing') and grounds for responses were coded for 
recommendations for which we report results and for some additional significant recommendations and 
issues. The basis for the coding of each letter was documented by reference to passages of text in a copy 
of the letter stored within Atlas.ti, a software package that facilitates the management and analysis of 
textual data. Second, for each exposure document, a test of inter-coder agreement based on the Kappa 
statistic (Cohen 1960; Giner and Arce 2012) was conducted. For this, one of the other two authors (the 
second coder) independently coded responses ('for', 'against', 'neutral/missing') for a sample of 25 letters 
for all recommendations and other issues that we coded.45 There were no significant differences between 
the two coders for any of the recommendations for which we report results. Third, by selective reference 
to sections of text in the annotated letters stored in Atlas.ti, a third author reviewed the reasonableness and 
consistency of the coding of responses and the coding of the grounds for responses for that exposure 
document. Fourth, a senior Accounting academic, who is not an author of this paper and who is an expert 
on accounting for financial instruments, reviewed collectively by reference to the annotated letters stored 
in Atlas.ti the overall reasonableness and consistency of the coding of responses and the coding of grounds 
for responses for all five exposure documents. 
 





Examples of the Application of Four Methods of Accounting for Credit Losses  
 
This appendix provides simplified numerical examples of the recognition of initially-expected credit 
losses for a portfolio of newly-originated fixed-rate loans. The examples describe the evolution over time 
of the loan account and, under four methods, the allowance account and the amortized-cost net book value 
(ACNBV) if initial expectations are realized. Changes from initial expectations are not considered. All 
examples use the same fact pattern for contractual cash flows and initially-expected shortfalls in collection. 
Total losses recognized over the life of the loans are the same under all methods but timing differs. 
 
The Four Methods for which we Provide Numerical Examples  
• Incurred loss. This method is intended to represent the pre-existing incurred-loss method. Credit losses 
are recognized on the occurrence of loss events as defined under that method.  
• Expected loss: Integrated effective interest rate (IEIR) (IASB 2009). Loss recognition is based on an 
information set that is less restricted and more forward-looking than that used to support loss 
recognition under the pre-existing incurred-loss method.46 Initially-expected (as of the origination 
date) shortfalls in collection are deducted from contractual cash flows in order to calculate the credit-
loss-inclusive integrated effective interest rate (IEIR). If shortfalls are expected, the IEIR is lower than 
the contractual effective interest rate (CEIR). Yearly interest is accrued at the IEIR and therefore 
comprises contractual interest less an allocation of a portion of any initially-expected losses. The 
allocated expected losses are credited to an allowance account against which shortfalls are charged off. 
• Expected loss: Lifetime loss (FASB 2010, 2012). A method of this sort was included in FASB (2016). 
Loss recognition is based on the less restricted more forward-looking information set. All lifetime 
expected losses are recognized immediately, including at day one. 
 
46 See the subsection of the text that deals with IASB (2009). This information set would include past events, current conditions, 
and reasonable and supportable forecasts of future credit-loss-relevant events and conditions.  
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• Expected loss: 12-month/lifetime loss (IASB 2013). A method of this sort was included in IASB 
(2014). It is sometimes termed a 'three-bucket' or 'three-stage' method. Loss recognition is based on the 
less restricted more forward-looking information set. Newly originated loans are placed in a non-credit-
deteriorated stage for which the loss allowance including at day one comprises 12-month expected 
losses, defined as the present value of lifetime cash shortfalls from default events possible in the next 
12 months weighted by the probability of occurrence of those events. Loans that subsequently suffer a 
significant increase in credit risk are then transferred to a stage for which lifetime losses are recognized.  
 
Assumed Fact Pattern and Assumptions Made in Applying the Methods  
Our example is based on a portfolio of six-year fixed-rate loans totaling Currency Units (CU) 100.00 
originated at year 0 (day one). The loans are originated on market terms such that their fair value is equal 
to the amount loaned (transaction price) of CU100.00. The loan contracts require repayments totaling 
CU22.96 per year in years 1 to 6. There are no fees or other costs. The CEIR is therefore ten percent. As of 
year 0, some as-yet-unidentified shortfalls in collection are expected. Streams of shortfalls are expected to 
be as follows: from year 3 (5% of yearly contractual payments); from year 4 (an additional 4%); from year 
5 (an additional 3%); in year 6 (an additional 2%). Because shortfalls are expected, the IEIR (7.94 percent) 
is lower than the CEIR. Shortfalls are charged off at the dates when the amounts are due to be received.47 
It is assumed that initial expectations of shortfalls are realized. The initially-expected shortfalls are 
recognized as credit losses as follows under each of the four methods considered, where the year at which 
a stream of shortfalls is expected to start is denoted year sf, the preceding year is denoted year sf-1, etc.: 
• Incurred loss. It is assumed that the loss from each stream of shortfalls is recognized at year sf-1 on 
the occurrence of an incurred-loss loss event related to that stream of shortfalls. Losses are measured 
as the present value of the streams of shortfalls, where the discount rate is the CEIR. 
 
47 This is a simplifying assumption. The date of charge-off has no effect on the pattern of loss recognition. 
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• Integrated effective interest rate (IEIR) (IASB 2009). Each year's allocation of initially-expected 
losses is equal to the opening balance on the loan account times the excess of the CEIR over the IEIR. 
• Lifetime loss (FASB 2010, 2012). Losses from all expected shortfalls are recognized at year 0 (day 
one). Losses are measured as the present value of shortfalls, where the discount rate is the CEIR. 
• 12-month/lifetime loss (IASB 2013). This example makes the simplifying assumption that what IASB 
(2013) terms default events and significant increases in credit risk are a single class of event termed 
'forward-looking loss events', which are identified by reference to the less restricted more forward-
looking information set. It is assumed that the loss from each stream of shortfalls is recognized within 
a lifetime loss allowance at year sf-2 on the occurrence of a forward-looking loss event, which is 
deemed to occur one year earlier than the corresponding incurred-loss loss event (i.e., at year sf-2 rather 
than at year sf-1). Because this method recognizes, in probability-weighted terms within a 12-month 
allowance, losses from loss events possible in the next 12 months and initial expectations are realized, 
shortfalls recognized as losses within the lifetime allowance at year sf-2 are initially recognized one 
year earlier at year sf-3. Therefore, shortfalls recognized as losses at year sf-1 under incurred loss are 
initially recognized as losses two years earlier at year sf-3 under this method. Losses are measured as 
the present value of the streams of shortfalls, where the discount rate is the CEIR. 
Table B.1 summarizes the fact pattern and the timing of recognition of initially-expected losses 
under each method. Table B.2 presents: (i) Panel A - the evolution of the loan account, which is the same 
under all methods; (ii) Panel B – for each method, the evolution of the allowance account and the ACNBV, 
and the net income recognized in each year (equal to interest less loss) as a percentage of the opening 
ACNBV;48 (iii) Panel C - a summary of losses under the four methods. Figure B.1 depicts the recognition 
over time of losses under the four methods. Total losses recognized are the same under all methods.
 
48 Because loss allowances are initially established at present value, part of the total losses is recognized through the subsequent 
unwind of the discount within the allowance account. Various methods have been proposed for reporting the unwind of the 





Contractual Cash Flows, Initially-Expected Shortfalls in Collection, Initially-Expected Cash Flows and the Recognition 
of Initially-Expected Losses Under the Four Methods 
 Year 0 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 
Contractual cash flows (CEIR: 10.00%) (Note 1) -100.00 22.96 22.96 22.96 22.96 22.96 22.96 
Initially-expected shortfalls in collection:        
From year 3 (5.00% of 22.96)    1.15 1.15 1.15 1.15 
From year 4 (4.00% of 22.96)     0.92 0.92 0.92 
From year 5 (3.00% of 22.96)      0.69 0.69 
In year 6 (2.00% of 22.96)       0.45 
Totals (= charge-offs) [Total shortfalls = 9.19]    1.15 2.07 2.76 3.21 
Initially-expected cash flows: contractual cash 
flows less initially-expected shortfalls in 
collection (IEIR: 7.94%) (Note 2) -100.00 22.96 22.96 21.81 20.89 20.20 19.75 
Recognition of initially-expected losses:        
Incurred loss (Note 3)   3.64 2.28 1.20 0.42  
IEIR (IASB 2009) (Note 4)  2.06 1.80 1.50 1.18 0.82 0.43 
Lifetime loss (FASB 2010; 2012) (Note 5) 5.80       
12-month/lifetime loss (IASB 2013) (Note 6) 3.01 1.89 0.99 0.35    
1. The contractual cash flows comprise the origination of loans totaling CU100.00 at year 0 and yearly repayments totaling 
CU22.96 per year from year 1 to year 6. The contractual effective interest rate (CEIR) is 10.00%. 
2. The integrated effective interest rate (IEIR) of 7.94% is calculated from the initially-expected cash flows. 
3. It is assumed that, under the incurred-loss method, each loss is equal to the present value of the stream of shortfalls starting 
one year later, discounted at the CEIR of 10.00%. The amounts recognized are as follows: 
3.64 = 1.15/1.10 + 1.15/1.102 + 1.15/1.103 + 1.15/1.104 
2.28 = 0.92/1.10 + 0.92/1.102 + 0.92/1.103 
1.20 = 0.69/1.10 + 0.69/1.102  
0.42 = 0.45/1.10. 
4. Under IEIR, each year's allocation of initially-expected losses is equal to the opening balance on the loan account times 
(CEIR – IEIR). (CEIR – IEIR) = 10.00% - 7.94% = 2.06%. The amounts recognized are as follows: 2.06 = 100.00*2.06%; 
1.80 = 87.04*2.06%; 1.50 = 72.78*2.06%; 1.18 = 57.10*2.06%; 0.82 = 39.85*2.06%; 0.43 = 20.87*2.06%. 
5. Under the lifetime loss method, initially-expected lifetime losses are all recognized at year 0 (day one). The amount 
recognized is the present value of the expected total shortfalls discounted at the CEIR of 10.00%: 
5.80 = 1.15/1.103 + 2.07/1.104 + 2.76/1.105 + 3.21/1.106. 
This gives a post-day-one-loss amortized-cost net book value (ACNBV) of 100.00 – 5.80 = 94.20. This is equal to the present 
value of the expected cash flows net of initially-expected shortfalls, discounted at the CEIR of 10.00%: 
94.20 = 22.96/1.10 + 22.96/1.102 + 21.81/1.103 + 20.89/1.104 + 20.20/1.105 + 19.75/1.106. 
This amount is also equal to the present value of the expected cash flows (after deducting initially-expected shortfalls), 
discounted at the IEIR of 7.94%, less the initially-expected shortfalls, discounted at the CEIR of 10.00%. This illustrates 
what some see as this method's double-counting of initially-expected shortfalls within the ACNBV on initial recognition (see 
equation (5)): 
94.20 = 22.96/1.0794+ 22.96/1.07942 + (22.96-1.15)/1.07943 + (22/96-2.07)/1.07944  
          + (22.96-2.76)/1.07945 + (22.96-3.21)/1.07946 - (1.15/1.103 + 2.07/1.104 + 2.76/1.105 + 3.21/1.106). 
6. It is assumed that, under 12-month/lifetime loss method, each loss is equal to the present value of the stream of shortfalls 
starting three years later, discounted at the CEIR of 10.00%. Relative to incurred loss: (i) the more forward-looking 
information set brings loss events forward by one year; (ii) the allowance for loss events possible in the next 12 months brings 
loss recognition forward by one more year. Therefore, relative to incurred loss, loss recognition is brought forward by two 
years in total. The amounts recognized are as follows: 
3.01 = 1.15/1.103 + 1.15/1.104 + 1.15/1.105 + 1.15/1.106 
1.89 = 0.92/1.103 + 0.92/1.104 + 0.92/1.105 
0.99 = 0.69/1.103 + 0.69/1.104  





Evolution of the Loan Account, the Allowance Accounts and the Amortized Cost Net Book Values 
Panel A: Loan Account – Common to All Methods 
Year  B/F Interest Cash C-off C/F 
0     100.00   100.00 
1 100.00 10.00 -22.96  87.04 
2 87.04 8.70 -22.96  72.78 
3 72.78 7.28 -21.81 -1.15 57.10 
4 57.10 5.71 -20.89 -2.07 39.85 
5 39.85 3.98 -20.20 -2.76 20.87 
6 20.87 2.09 -19.75 -3.21 0.00 
Panel B: Allowance Accounts, Net Book Values, Income and Income as a Percentage of Net Book Value Under the Four Methods 
 Allowance Accounts Amortized Cost Net Book Values (ACNBVs)   
Year B/F 
Discount 
Unwind  Addition C-off C/F B/F Interest Loss  Cash C/F NI % 
Method: Incurred loss         
0         0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 100.00 0.00  
1 0.00    0.00 100.00 10.00 0.00 -22.96 87.04 10.00 10.00% 
2 0.00  -3.64  -3.64 87.04 8.70 -3.64 -22.96 69.14 5.06 5.81% 
3 -3.64 -0.36 -2.28 1.15 -5.13 69.14 7.28 -2.64 -21.81 51.97 4.64 6.71% 
4 -5.13 -0.51 -1.20 2.07 -4.77 51.97 5.71 -1.71 -20.89 35.08 4.00 7.70% 
5 -4.77 -0.49 -0.42 2.76 -2.92 35.08 3.98 -0.91 -20.20 17.95 3.07 8.75% 
6 -2.92 -0.29   3.21 0.00 17.95 2.09 -0.29 -19.75 0.00 1.80 10.00% 
Method: IEIR (IASB 2009) (Note 2)        
0      0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 100.00 0.00  
1 0.00 0.00 -2.06  -2.06 100.00 10.00 -2.06 -22.96 84.98 7.94 7.94% 
2 -2.06 -0.16 -1.80  -4.02 84.98 8.70 -1.96 -22.96 68.76 6.74 7.94% 
3 -4.02 -0.33 -1.50 1.15 -4.70 68.76 7.28 -1.83 -21.81 52.40 5.45 7.94% 
4 -4.70 -0.37 -1.18 2.07 -4.18 52.40 5.71 -1.55 -20.89 35.67 4.16 7.94% 
5 -4.18 -0.34 -0.82 2.76 -2.58 35.67 3.98 -1.16 -20.20 18.29 2.82 7.94% 
6 -2.58 -0.20 -0.43 3.21 0.00 18.29 2.09 -0.63 -19.75 0.00 1.46 7.94% 
Method: Lifetime loss (FASB 2010; 2012)        
0    -5.80  -5.80 0.00 0.00 -5.80 100.00 94.20 -5.80  
1 -5.80 -0.58   -6.38 94.20 10.00 -0.58 -22.96 80.66 9.42 10.00% 
2 -6.38 -0.64   -7.02 80.66 8.70 -0.64 -22.96 65.76 8.06 10.00% 
3 -7.02 -0.70  1.15 -6.57 65.76 7.28 -0.70 -21.81 50.53 6.58 10.00% 
4 -6.57 -0.66  2.07 -5.16 50.53 5.71 -0.66 -20.89 34.69 5.05 10.00% 
5 -5.16 -0.52  2.76 -2.92 34.69 3.98 -0.52 -20.20 17.95 3.46 10.00% 
6 -2.92 -0.29   3.21 0.00 17.95 2.09 -0.29 -19.75 0.00 1.80 10.00% 
Method: 12-month/lifetime loss (IASB 2013)        
0     -3.01   -3.01 0.00 0.00 -3.01 100.00 96.99 -3.01  
1 -3.01 -0.30 -1.89  -5.20 96.99 10.00 -2.19 -22.96 81.84 7.81 8.05% 
2 -5.20 -0.51 -0.99  -6.70 81.84 8.70 -1.50 -22.96 66.08 7.20 8.79% 
3 -6.70 -0.67 -0.35 1.15 -6.57 66.08 7.28 -1.02 -21.81 50.53 6.26 9.48% 
4 -6.57 -0.66  2.07 -5.16 50.53 5.71 -0.66 -20.89 34.69 5.05 10.00% 
5 -5.16 -0.52  2.76 -2.92 34.69 3.98 -0.52 -20.20 17.95 3.46 10.00% 









(IASB 2009)  
Lifetime loss 
(FASB 2010, 2012) 
12M/lifetime 
(IASB 2013) 
Year  In year    Cumulative  In year   Cumulative In year Cumulative In year Cumulative 
0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 5.80 5.80 3.01 3.01 
1 0.00 0.00 2.06 2.06 0.58 6.38 2.19 5.20 
2 3.64 3.64 1.96 4.02 0.64 7.02 1.50 6.70 
3 2.64 6.28 1.83 5.85 0.70 7.72 1.02 7.72 
4 1.71 7.99 1.55 7.40 0.66 8.38 0.66 8.38 
5 0.91 8.90 1.16 8.56 0.52 8.90 0.52 8.90 
6 0.29 9.19 0.63 9.19 0.29 9.19 0.29 9.19 
1. Panel A gives the evolution of the loan account based on the contractual interest, the expected cash flows net of initially-
expected shortfalls, and the expected charge-offs as given in Table B.1. The loan account is the same under all methods. 
Panel B gives the evolution of the allowance account and the amortized-cost net book value (ACNBV) under each of the 
four methods. For each method, the ACNBV is the sum of the loan account and the allowance account under that method. 
Panel B also gives, for each method, the net income recognized on the loans in each year and the net income as a percentage 
of opening ACNBV for each year. Panel C summarizes the losses recognized in each year under each method, as given in 
Panel B, and the cumulative total of each set of losses. The year-6 cumulative total is the same under all methods. 
Cumulative losses under the four methods are depicted in Figure B.1. The columns in Panels A and B are as follows: 
B/F Balance brought forward. (Opening balance.) 
Interest Contractual interest revenue at the contractual effective interest rate (CEIR) of 10 percent, 
debited to the loan account. See also note 2. 
Cash Cash debited (on origination of loans) or credited (on repayments) to the loan account. These 
are the expected cash flows net of initially-expected shortfalls as given in Table B.1. The same 
amounts appear in the loan account and the ACNBV summaries.  
C-off Charge offs as given in Table B.1. Shortfalls are charged off at the dates when the amounts are 
due to be received. Within each year, the amount credited to the loan account is equal to the 
amount debited to the allowance account, and does not appear in the ACNBV summaries. 
C/F Balance carried forward. (Closing balance.) 
Discount Unwind The unwind of the discount that was applied on initial recognition/allocation of initially-
expected losses at present value. Under all methods, this is calculated by reference to the 
opening balance on the allowance account. It is calculated at the CEIR of 10 percent under the 
incurred-loss method, the lifetime loss method and the 12-month/lifetime loss method. It is 
calculated at the IEIR of 7.94 percent under the IEIR method. See also note 2.  
Addition Additions to the allowance account in respect of the initial recognition/allocation of initially-
expected losses. The calculation of these amounts is given in Table B.1. See also Note 2. 
Loss The sum of 'Discount Unwind' and 'Addition '. 
NI The net income recognized on the loans in the year. This is equal to 'Interest' less 'Loss'.  
% Net income (NI) expressed as a percentage of the opening ACNBV of the year. 
2. Under the IEIR method recommended in IASB (2009), the initially-expected shortfalls relative to contractual cash flows 
receivable that are recognized over the life of the loans are not reported simply as 'losses' but as allocations of portions of 
initially-expected shortfalls that are deducted within yearly net interest revenue. However, in order to harmonize 
presentation across methods, we include the allocations of the initially-expected shortfalls within 'loss' in our IEIR 
example. IASB (2009, paragraphs 15 and B22) requires that the amounts of initially-expected shortfalls that are allocated 
as deductions within yearly net interest revenue should be accumulated within an allowance account, as is done in this 
example. The yearly accrual of interest (net of the allocation of initially-expected shortfalls) at the IEIR times the opening 
ACNBV necessitates the unwind of a discount within the allowance account. This is demonstrated as follows:  
IEIR * Opening ACNBV = IEIR * (Opening Cost- Opening Allowance) 
 = (CEIR * Opening Cost) - ((CEIR-IEIR) * Opening Cost) - (IEIR * Opening Allowance). 
These three elements of the IEIR-based net interest are, respectively:  
• the contractual interest at the CEIR;  
• less: the excess of CEIR-based interest over IEIR-based interest; this is the allocation of initially-expected 
shortfalls within net interest, included within 'Addition' and 'Loss' in our IEIR example;  





Lifetime loss denotes the lifetime loss method (FASB 2010; FASB 2012); 12-month/lifetime loss denotes the 12-
month/lifetime loss method (IASB 2013); IEIR denotes the integrated-effective-interest-rate (IEIR) method (IASB 2009); 
Incurred loss denotes the incurred-loss method. Losses are inclusive of the unwind of discounts. 
 
Notable features of the relative timing of loss recognition under our assumptions are as follows.49 
• The non-IEIR methods are ranked as follows regarding early recognition of initially-expected losses: 
lifetime loss; 12-month/lifetime loss; incurred loss. Relative to incurred loss, the IEIR method 
accelerates recognition of initially-expected losses in early years but delays it in later years. 
• The pattern of loss recognition under 12-month/lifetime loss is the same as under incurred loss except 
that loss recognition is two years earlier under 12-month/lifetime loss. Relative to incurred loss: (i) 
the more forward-looking information set brings loss events forward by one year; (ii) the allowance 
for loss events possible in the next 12 months brings loss recognition forward by one more year. 
 
 


































Cumulative Losses Recognized From Year 0 to Year 6








 Recommendation Results 
Reported in 
Main Results of Analysis of Responses 
IASB (2009) 
(Initial IASB exposure 
draft) 
 1. Spreading the recognition of initially-expected credit 
losses over the life of assets. 
2. Spreading the recognition of initially-expected credit 
losses over the life of assets using an integrated effective 






Spreading of recognition of initially-expected 
losses was largely supported.  
 
The IEIR method of spreading was largely opposed, 
including on the practicability ground. 
FASB (2010) 
(Initial FASB exposure 
draft) 
 3. Recognition at each reporting date of an allowance for 





The allowance for all full-contractual-life expected 
losses was largely opposed, mainly on the grounds 
of practicability and day-one loss. 




document - aimed at 
achieving FASB/IASB 
convergence on 
accounting for credit 
losses) 
 4. A good-book/bad-book distinction. 
5. For financial assets in the good book, an allowance 
comprising time-proportional expected credit losses 
(TPA). 
6. For financial assets in the good book, an allowance 
comprising credit losses expected to occur within the 









Relative to non-U.S. respondents, U.S. respondents 
were less supportive of the spreading-focused TPA 
element of the method and more supportive of the 
allowance-adequacy-focused FFPA element. 
     
FASB (2012) 
(Final FASB exposure 




 7. Recognition at each reporting date of an allowance for 
all full-contractual-life expected credit losses. 




The allowance for all full-contractual-life expected 
losses was largely opposed, including on the 
grounds of practicability and day-one loss. There 
was more support for some form of incurred-loss 
method (pre-existing or a modified version). 
IASB (2013) 
(Final IASB exposure 
draft, leading to 
elements of IFRS 9 
(IASB 2014)) 
 8. Recognition of an allowance for 12-month expected 
credit losses for assets for which credit risk has not 
increased significantly since initial recognition. 
9. Recognition of an allowance for lifetime expected credit 
losses for assets for which credit risk has increased 





The 12-month allowance for non-credit-deteriorated 
assets and the lifetime allowance for assets for 
which credit risk has increased significantly since 
initial recognition were largely supported. This was 
despite widespread negative views about the day-
one-loss feature of the 12-month allowance. 




Summary of Respondents by non-U.S./U.S./Other and by Type of Respondent 










IASB (2009) 82 66 148     13 5 18 6 16 22 101 87 188 
FASB (2010)  25 22 47  582 42 624 2 14 16 609 78 687 
   - non-CB&CU     94 42 136       
   - CB&CU    488 0 488       
FASB/IASB (2011) 66 45 111    55 17 72 5 15 20 126 77 203 
   - non-CB&CU    49 17 66       
   - CB&CU       6 0 6       
FASB (2012) 11 3 14   263 42 305 4 12 16 278 57 335 
   - non-CB&CU     98 42 140       
   - CB&CU    165 0 165       
IASB (2013) 73 57 130 20 3 23 4 18 22 97 78 175 
 
In the main results tables, we report results for respondents assumed to be constituents or potential constituents of the board or boards that issued the relevant exposure 
document: non-U.S. respondents for recommendations in IASB EDs (IASB 2009; IASB 2013); U.S. respondents for recommendations in FASB EDs (FASB 2010; 
FASB 2012); non-U.S. respondents and U.S. respondents for recommendations in FASB/IASB (2011). Responses from 'other respondents' are not used in our tabulated 
tests, but some are used in an untabulated analysis. The numbers of respondents for which we report results in our main results tables are printed in bold type.  
 
For FASB (2010), our initial data set includes 2,971 letters. Most of these do not refer to credit-loss impairment and relate to the recommendation in FASB (2010) that 
most financial assets should be recognized at fair value. For FASB (2010), we analyze only those letters that commented on the credit-loss-impairment recommendations. 
 
CB&CU denotes U.S. preparer respondents that are Community Banks or Credit Unions. U.S. preparers are split into two types: preparers-non-CB&CU and preparers-






Panel A: Recommendation 1. Spreading the Recognition of Initially-Expected Credit Losses Over the Life of Assets 
(Non-U.S. Respondents) 
                 All          Preparers      Non-preparers 
Numbers of responses analyzed  148    82    66  
Percentages of Responses            
For  66%    66%    65%  
Against  14%    15%    14%  
Neutral/missing  20%    19%    21%  
Logistic Regression Results         
Constant  -3.65 ***   -4.88 ***   -3.02 *** 
  (-6.51)   (-3.44)   (-4.64) 
Practicability  1.44   0.36   0.64 
  (1.37)   (0.26)   (0.43) 
Usefulness  2.41   -1.46   4.11 ** 
  (1.49)   (-0.77)   (2.34) 
Objectivity  2.92 ***   6.92 ***   2.06 
  (2.66)   (2.80)   (1.24) 
Other conceptual issues  5.86 ***   6.49 ***   4.63 *** 
  (3.70)   (3.09)   (2.74) 
Allowance adequacy  1.86   4.29 **   1.00 
  (1.51)   (2.37)   (0.43) 
Wald Chi-square  33.23 ***   16.53 ***   12.86 ** 
         
Panel B: Recommendation 2. Spreading the Recognition of Initially-Expected Credit Losses Over the Life of Assets 
Using an Integrated Effective Interest Rate (IEIR) that Includes Initially-Expected Credit Losses.  (Non-U.S. 
Respondents) 
                 All          Preparers  Non-preparers 
Numbers of responses analyzed  148    82    66  
Percentages of Responses            
For  34%    21%    50%  
Against  62%    77%    44%  
Neutral/missing  4%    2%    6%  
Logistic Regression Results            
Constant  -2.21 ***   -1.62 *   -2.34 *** 
  (-3.30)   (-1.83)   (-2.74) 
Practicability  2.00 ***   2.12 **   1.28 
  (2.73)   (2.18)   (1.31) 
Usefulness  1.50 **   1.51 *   1.61 
  (2.37)   (1.75)   (1.38) 
Objectivity  -0.51   -0.52   -0.69 
  (-0.80)   (-0.66)   (-0.59) 
Other conceptual issues  4.25 ***   2.80 *   4.28 *** 
  (2.94)   (1.85)   (2.81) 
Economic consequences  0.92   0.10   1.56 
  (0.88)   (0.06)   (1.24) 
Allowance adequacy  1.30   0.76   -1.55 
  (0.79)   (0.46)   (-0.66) 
Wald Chi-square  26.01 ***   13.94 **   13.75 ** 
Grounds with High Negatives         
Practicability  80%   85%   74% 
Usefulness  41%   52%   27% 
The logistic regression results are from estimation of model (1): _ 0 ,
1
n g






where: against_recommendationr is equal to 1 if respondent r is against the recommendation and 0 otherwise; groundn,r is equal to 1 if ground 
n, which is one of the g grounds in the model, is cited negatively by respondent r and 0 otherwise. Z-statistics are in parentheses. ***, ** and 
* indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. The grounds included in each regression model are those cited negatively 
by three percent or more of the relevant type of respondent. Under 'Grounds with High Negatives', we report for each ground cited negatively 






Recommendation 3. Recognition at Each Reporting Date of an Allowance for All Full-Contractual-Life Expected Credit Losses (U.S. Respondents) 
 All  Preparers-all  Preparers-non-CB&CU  Preparers-CB&CU  Non-preparers 
Numbers of responses analyzed  624    582    94    488    42  
Percentages of Responses                    
For  5%    4%    17%    1%    21%  
Against  74%    77%    49%    82%    33%  
Neutral/missing  21%    19%    34%    17%    46%  
Logistic Regression Results          
Constant  -1.85 ***   -2.04 ***   -2.09 ***   -2.16 ***   -1.84 *** 
  (-8.50)   (-7.82)   (-4.62)   (-6.31)   (-3.63) 
Practicability  5.98 ***   6.17 ***   3.31 ***   6.63 ***    
  (13.25)   (13.02)   (3.90)   (11.34)    
Objectivity        2.05      2.91 * 
        (1.61)      (1.69) 
Day-one loss  4.98 ***   5.02 ***   4.82 ***      4.01 ** 
  (5.78)   (5.73)   (5.14)      (2.54) 
Other conceptual issues        4.07 **      4.04 *** 
        (2.21 )      (2.56) 
Economic consequences        -0.69       
        (-0.37)       
Wald Chi-square  193.13 ***   182.62 ***   37.01 ***   128.57 ***   13.30 *** 
Grounds with High Negatives                
Practicability  66%   70%   13%   81%   2% 
The logistic regression results are from estimation of model (1): _ 0 ,
1
n g





  , 
where: against_recommendationr is equal to 1 if respondent r is against the recommendation and 0 otherwise; groundn,r is equal to 1 if ground n, which is one of the g grounds in the model, is cited negatively by respondent 
r and 0 otherwise. Z-statistics are in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. The grounds included in each regression model are those cited negatively by three 
percent or more of the relevant type of respondent. CB&CU denotes U.S. preparer respondents that are Community Banks or Credit Unions. Under 'Grounds with High Negatives', we report for each ground cited 





Panel A: Recommendation 4. A Good-Book/Bad-Book Distinction (Non-U.S. Respondents) 
                 All          Preparers  Non-preparers 
Numbers of responses analyzed  111    66    45  
Percentages of Responses            
For  86%    82%    93%  
Against  10%    12%    7%  
Neutral/missing  4%    6%    0%  
Logistic Regression Results         
Constant  -3.35 ***   -2.87 ***   -4.03 *** 
  (-5.31)   (-4.36)   (-2.83) 
Practicability  4.50 ***   4.75 ***   3.90 ** 
  (3.92)   (2.80)   (2.15) 
Usefulness  0.53   -2.74   1.68 
  (0.25)   (-0.88)   (0.78) 
Objectivity  -3.75   -0.16   -1.33 
  (-1.38)   (-0.09)   (-0.75) 
Other conceptual issues  5.28 ***   4.82 ***   2.47 
  (3.41)   (2.92)   (1.31) 
Wald Chi-square  21.47 ***   15.61 ***   7.39 
         
Panel B: Recommendation 5. For Financial Assets in the Good Book, an Allowance Comprising Time-
Proportional Expected Credit Losses (TPA) (Non-U.S. Respondents) 
 All  Preparers  Non-preparers 
Number of responses analyzed  111    66    45  
Percentages of Responses            
For  76%    71%    82%  
Against  19%    20%    18%  
Neutral/missing  5%    9%    0%  
Logistic Regression Results        
Constant  -3.47 ***   -3.37 ***   -3.05 *** 
  (-5.39)   (-4.10)   (-3.63) 
Practicability  3.00 ***   2.56 **   2.84 *** 
  (3.89)   (2.44)   (2.74) 
Usefulness  0.64   0.55   1.40 
  (0.59)   (0.41)   (0.89) 
Objectivity  0.75   0.53   1.13 
  (0.66)   (0.39)   (0.62) 
Other conceptual issues  5.87 ***   5.77 ***   2.72 
  (3.66)   (3.42)   (1.17) 
Allowance adequacy  1.53   1.90   1.25 
  (1.02)   (1.08)   (0.72) 







Panel C: Recommendation 6. For Financial Assets in the Good Book, an Allowance Comprising Credit Losses 
Expected to Occur Within the Foreseeable Future Period (FFPA) (Non-U.S. Respondents)  
 All  Preparers  Non-preparers 
Number of responses analyzed  111    66    45  
Percentages of Responses            
For  44%    44%    44%  
Against  52%    50%    56%  
Neutral/missing  4%    6%    0%  
Logistic Regression Results        
Constant  -1.50 ***   -1.78 ***   -1.03 ** 
  (-3.99)   (-3.50)   (-1.98) 
Practicability  1.80 ***   1.69 *   1.98 ** 
  (2.60)   (1.69)   (2.03) 
Usefulness  -0.01   0.47   -1.55 
  (-0.01)   (0.61)   (-1.04) 
Objectivity  1.33   1.69 *   1.60 
  (1.52)   (1.68)   (0.83) 
Day-one loss  2.67 ***   3.00 **   1.85 ** 
  (4.67)   (3.57)   (2.56) 
Other conceptual issues  2.74 ***   2.60 ***   2.98 * 
  (3.44)   (2.94)   (1.86) 
Economic consequences  -2.36      -0.93 
  (-0.84)      (-0.27) 
Allowance overstatement  -0.62   -2.10   0.79 
  (-0.57)   (-1.45)   (0.48) 






Panel D: Recommendation 4. A Good-Book/Bad-Book Distinction (U.S. Respondents) 
 All  Preparers-all  Preparers-non-CB&CU  Preparers-CB&CU  Non-preparers 
Number of responses analyzed  72    55    49    6    17  
Percentages of Responses                    
For  49%    45%    47%    33%    59%  
Against  43%    44%    41%    67%    41%  
Neutral/missing  8%    11%    12%    0%    0%  
Logistic Regression Results          
Constant  -0.90 **   -1.06 **   -1.25 ***   NA    NA 
  (-2.48)   (-2.54)   (-2.67)        
Practicability  3.12 ***   3.14 ***   3.06 ***   NA    NA 
  (3.39)   (3.19)   (3.10)        
Usefulness  0.47   0.93   1.05   NA    NA 
  (0.64)   (1.08)   (1.20)        
Objectivity  -1.90 *   -1.42   -1.40   NA    NA 
  (-1.86)   (-1.29)   (-1.26)        
Other conceptual issues  0.65   0.24   0.37   NA    NA 
  (0.88)   (0.26)   (0.40)        
Allowance adequacy  0.33         NA    NA 
  (0.27)              










Panel E: Recommendation 5. For Financial Assets in the Good Book, an Allowance Comprising Time-Proportional Expected Credit Losses (TPA) (U.S. Respondents)  
 All  Preparers-all  Preparers-non-CB&CU  Preparers-CB&CU  Non-preparers 
Number of responses analyzed  72    55    49    6    17  
Percentages of Responses                    
For  26%    22%    24%    0%    41%  
Against  64%    67%    65%    83%    53%  
Neutral/missing  10%    11%    11%    17%    6%  
Logistic Regression Results          
Constant  -0.97 **   -0.86 *   -1.18 *   NA    NA 
  (-2.23)   (-1.69)   (-1.97)        
Practicability  1.74 ***   1.87 ***   2.06 **   NA    NA 
  (2.86)   (2.60)   (2.52)        
Usefulness  0.78   0.47   -0.19   NA    NA 
  (0.93)   (0.52)   (-0.18)        
Objectivity  -0.15   -0.30   0.24   NA    NA 
  (-0.11)   (-0.19)   (0.17)        
Other conceptual issues  3.11 **   2.76 *   3.45 **   NA    NA 
  (2.07)   (1.76)   (1.99)        
Economic consequences  1.68   0.71   0.47   NA    NA 
  (0.94)   (0.35)   (0.23)        
Allowance adequacy  0.89   1.21   1.75   NA    NA 
  (0.98)   (1.02)   (1.39)        











Panel F: Recommendation 6. For Financial Assets in the Good Book, an Allowance Comprising Credit Losses Expected to Occur Within the Foreseeable Future Period 
(FFPA) (U.S. Respondents) 
 All  Preparers-all  Preparers-non-CB&CU  Preparers-CB&CU  Non-preparers 
  Total    Total    Total    Total    Total  
Number of responses analyzed  72    55    49    6    17  
Percentages of Responses                    
For  56%    60%    63%    33%    41%  
Against  35%    29%    27%    50%    53%  
Neutral/missing  9%    11%    10%    17%    6%  
Logistic Regression Results          
Constant  -1.38 ***   -1.47 ***   -1.80 ***   NA    NA 
  (-3.76)   (-3.57)   (-3.60)        
Practicability  3.26 **   3.27 **   3.81 **   NA    NA 
  (2.20)   (2.33)   (2.38)        
Usefulness  -0.27   0.18   0.68   NA    NA 
  (-0.28)   (0.18)   (0.65)        
Objectivity  -0.87   -0.87   -0.59   NA    NA 
  (-0.50)   (-0.47)   (0.70)        
Day-one loss  1.39   0.84   -0.30   NA    NA 
  (1.49)   (0.78)   (-0.18)        
Other conceptual issues  0.16         NA    NA 
  (0.06)              
Economic consequences  2.05   2.37   1.88   NA    NA 
  (0.94)   (0.93)   (0.74)        
Allowance adequacy  1.46   0.46   0.78   NA    NA 
  (1.16)   (0.27)   (0.44)        
Allowance overstatement  2.25         NA    NA 
  (0.66)              
Wald Chi-square  15.90 **   9.32   9.91   NA    NA 
The logistic regression results are from estimation of model (1): _ 0 ,
1
n g





  , 
where: against_recommendationr is equal to 1 if respondent r is against the recommendation and 0 otherwise; groundn,r is equal to 1 if ground n, which is one of the g grounds in the model, is cited negatively by respondent r 
and 0 otherwise.  Z-statistics are in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. The grounds included in each regression model are those cited negatively by three percent or 
more of the relevant type of respondent. CB&CU denotes U.S. preparer respondents that are Community Banks or Credit Unions. Because of the small numbers of observations, the model is not estimated for U.S. preparers-
CB&CU and U.S. non-preparers. For each ground cited negatively by more than 50 percent of any type of respondent, we report the percentages of respondents that cited the ground negatively. There were no such cases for 






Recommendation 7. Recognition at Each Reporting Date of an Allowance for All Full-Contractual-Life Expected Credit Losses (U.S. Respondents) 
 All  Preparers-all  Preparers-non-CB&CU  Preparers-CB&CU  Non-preparers 
Number of responses analyzed  305    263    98    165    42  
Percentages of Responses                    
For  12%    8%    20%    0%    38%  
Against  85%    90%    73%    99%    57%  
Neutral/missing  3%    2%    7%    1%    5%  
Logistic Regression Results          
Constant  -1.40 ***   -1.30 **   -1.70 **   NA    -2.64 * 
  (-3.12)   (-2.38)   (-2.46)       (-1.89) 
Practicability  1.85 ***   2.23 ***   2.13 ***   NA    1.92 
  (3.90)   (3.81)   (2.79)       (1.28) 
Usefulness  1.22 **   0.54   0.82   NA    3.19 ** 
  (2.14)   (0.80)   (1.06)       (1.98) 
Objectivity  0.57   1.36 *   0.42   NA    -0.33 
  (1.15)   (1.91)   (0.51)       (-0.30) 
Day-one loss  1.89 ***   1.42 **   1.12   NA    4.00 ** 
  (3.34)   (2.18)   (1.48)       (1.99) 
Other conceptual issues  0.89   -0.95   0.16   NA    9.09 *** 
  (0.97)   (-0.86)   (0.13)       (2.63) 
Economic consequences  0.94   0.58   -0.57   NA    2.36 
  (1.02)   (0.57)   (-0.39)       (1.36) 
Regulatory capital  3.14 ***   3.82 **   1.47   NA     
  (3.32)   (2.54)   (0.74)        
Allowance adequacy  1.90   1.07   1.34   NA     
  (1.08)   (0.63)   (0.56)        
Allowance overstatement  -0.28   0.64   1.96   NA    -7.30 ** 
  (-0.30)   (0.40)   (0.80)       (-2.51) 
Wald Chi-square  44.34 ***   30.88 ***   17.24 **   NA    10.85 
Grounds with High Negatives                 
Practicability  84%   84%   82%   86%    79% 
Objectivity  53%   55%   39%   64%    45% 
Day-one loss  47%   50%   42%   55%    29% 
Regulatory capital  33%   38%   9%   55%    2% 
The logistic regression results are from estimation of model (1): _ 0 ,
1
n g





  ,   
where: against_recommendationr is equal to 1 if respondent r is against the recommendation and 0 otherwise; groundn,r is equal to 1 if ground n, which is one of the g grounds in the model, is cited negatively by respondent r 
and 0 otherwise. Z-statistics are in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. The grounds included in each regression model are those cited negatively by three percent or 
more of the relevant type of respondent. CB&CU denotes U.S. preparer respondents that are Community Banks or Credit Unions. Because only one CB&CU respondent is not against the recommendation, the model is not 






Summary of Preferences for Three-Buckets and Incurred Loss for U.S. Respondents That Were Against Recommendation 7 (Recognition at 
Each Reporting Date of an Allowance for Full-Contractual-Life Expected Credit Losses) 
 
 Total U.S. 
Respondents to 
FASB (2012) 
(see Table 6) 
 Respondents Against 
Recommendation 7 
 
(see Table 6) 
 Percentages of Respondents Against Recommendation 7 
















Of Which Both are 
Mentioned Favorably by: 
Preparers-non-CB&CU 98  73% 72  8% 64% 3% 
Preparers-CB&CU 165  99% 164  9% 54% 5% 
Preparers - all 263  90% 236  9% 57% 4% 
Non-preparers 42  57% 24  0% 58% 0% 
All U.S. respondents 305  85% 260  8% 57% 4% 
 






Panel A: Recommendation 8. Recognition of an Allowance for 12-Month Expected Credit Losses for Assets 
for which Credit Risk Has Not Increased Significantly Since Initial Recognition. (Non-U.S. Respondents) 
 All  Preparers  Non-preparers 
Number of responses analyzed  130   73   57 
Percentages of Responses            
For  72%   74%   70% 
Against  23%   21%   26% 
Neutral/missing  5%   5%   4% 
Logistic Regression Results         
Constant  -2.44 ***   -2.42 ***   -3.16 ** 
  (-4.50)    (-3.65)    (-2.20)  
Practicability  1.78 ***   2.58 ***   0.02  
  (2.68)    (2.99)    (0.01)  
Usefulness  1.71 **   1.76    1.51  
  (2.01)    (1.43)    (1.35)  
Day-one loss  1.13 *   0.66    2.42  
  (1.90)    (0.85)    (1.63)  
Other conceptual issues  0.96    1.04    1.68  
  (1.34)    (1.12)    (1.04)  
Allowance adequacy  1.71        3.63 ** 
  (1.63)        (2.04)  
Allowance overstatement  1.62 *   2.09 *   0.74  
  (1.72)    (1.73)    (0.60)  
Wald Chi-square  17.05 ***   13.30 **   7.15  
Grounds with High Negatives            
Day-one loss  51%    48%    54%  
 
Panel B: Recommendation 9. Recognition of an Allowance for Lifetime Expected Credit Losses for Assets for which 
Credit Risk Has Increased Significantly Since Initial Recognition (Non-U.S. Respondents) 
 All  Preparers  Non-preparers 
Number of responses analyzed  130   73   57 
Percentages of Responses            
For  72%   71%   72% 
Against  22%   22%   23% 
Neutral/missing  6%   7%   5% 
Logistic Regression Results         
Constant  -2.90 ***   -2.63 ***   -3.18 *** 
  (-5.95)    (-4.73)    (-3.66)  
Practicability  2.57 ***   2.28 ***   2.67 *** 
  (3.95)    (2.79)    (2.73)  
Usefulness  0.40    1.77    -1.82  
  (0.39)    (1.09)    (-0.92)  
Objectivity  0.66    -0.14    1.29  
  (0.59)    (-0.06)    (0.97)  
Other conceptual issues  2.95 ***   2.38 ***   3.74 *** 
  (4.53)    (3.07)    (3.16)  
Allowance adequacy  3.35 ***       3.68 *** 
  (3.07)        (2.70)  
Cliff effect  -1.36        1.53  
  (-0.49)        (0.83)  
Wald Chi-square  28.92 ***   15.86 ***   13.12 ** 
The logistic regression results are from estimation of model (1): _ 0 ,
1
n g






where: against_recommendationr is equal to 1 if respondent r is against the recommendation and 0 otherwise; groundn,r is equal to 1 if ground n, which is 
one of the g grounds in the model, is cited negatively by respondent r and 0 otherwise. Z-statistics are in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance 
at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. The grounds included in each regression model are those cited negatively by three percent or more of the 
relevant type of respondent. Under 'Grounds with High Negatives', we report for each ground cited negatively by more than 50 percent of any type of 
respondent the percentages of respondents that cited the ground negatively. There were no such cases for recommendation 9. 
